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TAXING GREED 
Genevieve Tokić* 
        Appeals to greed in support of various tax proposals are often seen in 
response to populist moods in politics.  Such appeals may be used to garner 
political support for a policy or proposal.  However, there has been little 
academic consideration of the role of greed (or attitudes towards greed) in 
the law, and in tax law in particular.  This Article seeks to fill that gap by 
taking a close look at the concept of greed.  In doing so, the Article first 
surveys the history of greed and its meaning, and draws on political 
philosophy and economic literature to provide a working definition of greed.  
The Article then investigates the role of greed in tax law, focusing on the 
issue of executive compensation, in order to consider whether “greed” is 
merely political rhetoric, or if it can provide a framework or analytical tool 
that is useful for crafting tax rules aimed at correcting or remedying excess.                     
The Article ultimately concludes that, while “greed” is indeed a powerful 
rhetorical tool, its application in tax law and policy should be limited to 
situations where greed manifests as the appropriation of money, wealth or 
goods for personal gain, accompanied by illegality, a breach of fiduciary 
duty or contract, or indicators of market failure or manipulation.  In such 
scenarios, carefully considering the meaning of greed and thinking about 
our reactions to it in crafting tax law and policy may help tailor rules to 
target the negative aspects of the behavior in question.  The goal of this 
“taxing greed” paradigm is thus to reduce unfairness and correct distortions 
created by greedy behavior.  In the realm of executive compensation, the 
analytical framework around greed developed in this Article indicates that 
executive compensation may be a proper target for higher rates of tax. 
 
 
 * Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law; the author wishes to 
thank participants in the 19th Annual Critical Tax Conference at Tulane University Law School for 
helpful feedback, as well as participants and organizers of the Tax Policy Colloquium at Loyola 
Law School, Los Angeles, and in particular Professors Jennifer Kowal and Katie Pratt for their 
comments on an earlier draft. All errors and omissions are the author’s own. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 “My whole life I’ve been greedy, greedy, greedy. I’ve grabbed all the 
money I could get. I’m so greedy. But now I want to be greedy for the 
United States. I want to grab all that money. I’m going to be greedy for 
the United States.”1—Donald Trump, January 28, 2016. 
 
 “To those on Wall Street who may be listening today, let me be very 
clear. Greed is not good. In fact, the greed of Wall Street and corporate 
America is destroying the fabric of our nation.”2—Bernie Sanders, 
January 5, 2016. 
 
Greed is at least as old as human civilization, and it has been 
condemned as a vice for just as long. Over time, however, the meaning 
of greed has become increasingly complex, sometimes conflated with 
the concept of wealth-maximizing self-interest.3 The idea of greed 
tends to excite strong reactions. Human beings typically are quick to 
condemn what they view as unfair greedy behavior,4 yet at other times, 
greed is admired and emulated.5 In an era of rising inequality and 
expanding populist political movements, there is a resurgence of the 
term “greed” in political rhetoric. This makes it an opportune time to 
review our thinking on greed and its relationship with the tax laws, 
one of the most powerful distributional and regulatory tools of the 
federal government. 
Greed, as the term is used in common parlance, is malleable, 
subjective, and, to some extent, instinctive—many people take an “I 
know it when I see it” attitude towards greed. This makes it difficult 
to define or incorporate greed into any discussion of policy or law. 
However, a careful evaluation of political and economic philosophy, 
together with literature from behavioral economics and psychology, 
 
 1. Presidential Candidate Donald Trump Rally in Des Moines, Iowa, C-SPAN (Jan. 28, 
2016), http://www.c-span.org/video/?403832-1/presidential-candidate-donald-trump-rally-des-mo 
ines-iowa. 
 2. See Dan Roberts, Bernie Sanders Outlines Plan to End Wall Street’s ‘Greed, Fraud and 
Arrogance’, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/05/bernie-
sanders-wall-street-reform-plan-hillary-clinton. 
 3. As Judge Easterbrook has said, “greed is the foundation of much economic activity.” 
Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323, 1326 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 4. See, e.g., STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, TAX FAIRNESS AND FOLK JUSTICE 39, 44 (2013) 
(discussing evidence of an ingrained sense of fairness from experiments such as the ultimatum 
game, discussed further in Part II.C. infra, as well as public outrage aroused by events of public 
“greed,” such as the Bernie Madoff scandal). 
 5. This shifting conception of greed is discussed further in Part II infra. 
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reveals that there are certain identifiable features of what can be 
labeled fair and unfair behavior, of acceptable self-interest and a 
morally reprehensible pursuit of material gain at the cost of all else. 
This approach can assist in developing a framework for greed that 
makes it a useful analytical tool for evaluating tax policy: because 
greed by its nature violates deep-seated notions of fairness and moral 
mandates, it adds to the usual tax policy tools by illustrating scenarios 
in which the tax law may be able to correct for injustices that 
undermine public faith in the overall fairness of the tax system. 
Greed is rarely an explicit target of the federal income tax laws. 
However, societal attitudes toward greed are implicit in many laws 
and regulations, including tax law. One such area is in the realm of 
executive compensation. However, while greed is explicitly 
mentioned from time to time in political rhetoric around executive 
compensation, an analysis of greed and the tax law, including the tax 
rules regarding executive compensation, has never been carried out. 
This Article fills this gap, by exploring the role of greed in tax policy-
making, with a focus on the issue of executive compensation. 
In doing so, the paper will first explore the relevance of greed to 
tax policy. Part II will examine the relationship between greed, 
fairness, virtue ethics, and economics, as well as the historical 
evolution of the concept of greed and how it actually manifests in 
human and economic behavior. Part III will then develop a definition 
of greed through an examination of the theoretical and philosophical 
underpinnings of law, economics, and morality, and an exploration of 
the concept of “folk justice.”6 Part IV then applies the concept of greed 
developed in Part III to the problem of executive compensation, 
developing a mechanism for taxing executive “greed,” and focusing 
on what “greed” as an analytical tool can add to the discussion of tax 
policy related to executive compensation. 
This Article ultimately concludes that, while “greed” is a 
powerful rhetorical tool for justifying or garnering support for a rule, 
its application in tax law and policy should be limited to situations 
where greed manifests as the appropriation of money, wealth or goods 
for personal gain, accompanied by agency costs, market failure, or 
manipulation. In such scenarios, a careful consideration of the 
 
 6. The discussion of folk justice is drawn from the work of Steven M. Sheffrin in his book 
TAX FAIRNESS AND FOLK JUSTICE (2013). 
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meaning of greed and our reactions to it adds to the tax policy 
discussion of fairness and justice because it inherently coopts folk 
justice concepts of desert and moral outrage into its analysis. Thus, the 
goal of this “taxing greed” paradigm is to reduce unfairness and 
correct distortions created by greedy behavior in order to improve the 
tax system in ways that resonate with public perceptions of justice. In 
the realm of executive compensation, the analytical framework around 
greed developed in this Article indicates that executive compensation 
may be a proper target for higher rates of tax. An approach focused on 
remedying the impacts of greedy behavior aids in designing a tax 
response to the problem of excessive executive compensation. 
II.  WHAT’S WRONG WITH GREED? 
 “Greed.” The term is used in political rhetoric, popular culture, 
and even in legal proceedings.7 Examples of greed are cited 
everywhere, but their portrayals reveal the complexity of the concept. 
Ebenezer Scrooge, the greedy miser, is the focal character of Charles 
Dickens’s enduring story A CHRISTMAS CAROL, which details 
Scrooge’s reform from a cold-hearted money-hoarder to a kinder, 
happier and more generous individual. The character Gordon Gekko, 
widely renowned for his “greed is good” speech in the 1987 film 
WALL STREET, has been both hailed as a folk hero by real-life Wall 
Streeters, and reviled as a villain by others.8 
What makes a person greedy? Money certainly has something to 
do with it, but that alone is far from sufficient—few people begrudge 
Warren Buffet for his fortune, for example. In one of the opening 
quotations to this Article, Bernie Sanders refers to the greed of Wall 
Street, but closer inspection reveals that this blanket characterization 
is inaccurate, and few people in America probably believe that “Wall 
Street” as an institution, or that all the people who work in high 
finance, are actually greedy. Donald Trump called himself greedy in 
the other epigraph above, but the meaning of the term as he used it 
appears to refer to general acquisitiveness or materialism—in other 
 
 7. For a discussion of the treatment of “greed” in caselaw, see Part 0 infra; see also Eric A. 
Posner, The Jurisprudence of Greed, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1105–06 (2003). 
 8. See Jake Zamansky, The New Gordon Gekko: Greed is Bad, FORBES (Feb. 29, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jakezamansky/2012/02/29/the-new-gordon-gekko-greed-is-
bad/#250b3e361b70. 
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words, profit-maximizing self-interest—and not necessarily the 
pernicious greed typically thought of as a vice in modern-day society. 
When “greed” is levied as a criticism, it is not always without 
controversy, but there are fictional caricatures (Ebenezer Scrooge, 
probably Gordon Gekko) as well as real-life archetypes of greedy 
behavior that most people can agree upon. When the wealthy “hotel 
queen” Leona Helmsley was convicted of tax evasion in the late 
1980s, reportedly having stated that “only the little people pay taxes,” 
she was widely reviled as greedy and deserving of the prison term she 
received. More recently, in March 2009 when the insurance company 
American International Group (“AIG”) announced bonuses in excess 
of $200 million for employees in its financial services division, 
months after accepting a bailout from the United States Treasury 
totaling an estimated $180 billion9 and posting the largest fourth-
quarter loss in American corporate history, it was met with outrage.10 
The House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a bill levying a 
near-total tax on the bonuses of bailout recipients, though the bill did 
not make it through the Senate.11 Other less extreme measures were 
taken to restrict such bonuses.12 
These examples illustrate how the law currently deals with greed: 
in extreme examples there may be criminal penalties, for example 
when greed results in tax evasion or illegal insider trading. In other 
scenarios, the law has yet to come to terms with greedy behavior and 
how to restrict or prohibit it, as illustrated by the AIG bonus scandal. 
The remainder of this Section will explore why a careful analysis and 
 
 9. See Jesse Nankin & Krista Kjellman Schmidt, History of U.S. Gov’t Bailouts, 
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 15, 2009), https://www.propublica.org/special/government-bailouts. 
 10. As will be discussed in Part III.B.1, infra, this sense of outrage is described in the 
behavioral economics and psychology literature as moral outrage triggered by moral mandates—
self-expressive moral positions or stances—which are an aspect of how people inherently perceive 
justice. See Linda J. Skitka & David A. Houston, When Due Process Is of No Consequence: Moral 
Mandates and Presumed Defendant Guilt or Innocence, 14 SOC. JUST. RES. 305 (2001). This sense 
of moral outrage and its origins are not adequately described by traditional theories of justice, and 
the analysis of greed contained herein thus adds to the consideration of justice and fairness in tax 
policy because it inherently coopts the moral mandates theory into its analysis. 
 11. A Bill to Impose an Additional Tax on Bonuses Received from Certain TARP Recipients, 
H.R. 1586, 111th Cong. § 1 (1st Sess. 2009); see also Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, House 
Approves 90% Tax on Bonuses After Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2009/03/20/business/20bailout.html?mcubz=3. 
 12. See Tracy A. Thomas, Bailouts, Bonuses, and the Return of Unjust Gains, 87 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 437, 438–39 (2009). 
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understanding of greed and greedy behavior are important in the law 
generally and tax policy more specifically. 
A.  Greed, Justice, Economics, and Tax Policy 
Greed is a complex concept, bound up with religion and morals, 
economics, politics, and human relationships. Early on, thinkers such 
as Plato and Socrates recognized the link between greed and justice. 
For example, Plato’s summary of Socrates’s dialogues in The Republic 
suggested that greed drives individuals to act immorally and 
unjustly.13 Similarly, Aristotle believed that greed was the vice that 
caused people to break the rules of law and fairness and to seek more 
at the expense of communal canons of distributive justice.14 Later 
philosophers such as David Hume also described greed as a universal 
vice “directly destructive of human society.”15 However, Hume also 
acknowledged that while greed is potentially destructive, profit-
maximizing self-interest has the positive aspect of motivating 
commerce.16 Hume did not go on to draw a line between commercial 
self-interest and morally objectionable greed. Adam Smith and later 
economists and philosophers also focused on this “positive” aspect of 
self-interested behavior in their writings. Thus, while greed is harmful 
from a perspective of fairness and community welfare, self-interest 
may be a positive force, at least to an extent, with respect to capitalist 
market economics.17 
Accordingly, even in the early economic literature, it was 
recognized that self-interested behavior is valuable to a free market 
economy, but some types of extreme self-interest may actually be 
destructive or cause inefficiencies. But this Article will argue that 
greed goes beyond the economist’s consideration of inefficiencies or 
 
 13. Long Wang & J. Keith Murnighan, On the Duality of Greed, 4 (Kellogg School of 
Management, Working Paper No. 378, 2008 (citing RYAN K. BALOT, GREED AND INJUSTICE IN 
CLASSICAL ATHENS (2001)). 
 14. RYAN K. BALOT, GREED AND INJUSTICE IN CLASSICAL ATHENS, 33 (2001). 
 15. Wang & Murnighan, supra note 13, at 5 (citing DAVID HUME, Of Avarice, in ESSAYS, 
MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 1986) (1987)). 
 16. Id. 
 17. As discussed in Parts III and IV of this Article, use of greed in tax policy should be limited 
to situations where greed is harmful, and rules should be carefully tailored to avoid limiting the 
ability of what people may think of as “greed” to “do good”. As expressed in one article in the 
popular press, “[w]e believe that greed can do good, not that it is good.” John Paul Rollert, Greed 
Is Good: A 300-Year History of a Dangerous Idea, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/business/archive/2014/04/greed-is-good-a-300-year-history-of-a-dangerous-
idea/360265. 
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costly externalities, in its relationship to tax policy. Taxation 
undergirds the social contract that any government or political order 
rests on, and that political order incorporates rules relating to justice, 
fairness, and the proper distribution of resources, all of which are 
potentially violated by greedy behavior. Because of greed’s 
relationship to strong moral positions regarding fairness and justice, 
consideration of greed in tax policy can help to ensure that the tax 
system resonates with the public’s moral stance. 
In the law generally, greed has been referenced in court cases 
relating to contract disputes and torts, especially in cases with 
allegations of fraud.18 Curbing greed is often cited as a goal of 
legislative attempts to regulate accounting and the financial sector in 
the wake of scandals and financial fraud.19 Additionally, as Professor 
Posner and others have observed, greed, or at least an “aversion to too 
much money making,” was the impetus behind the adoption of U.S. 
antitrust law.20 Unlike in these areas of the law, explicit references to 
greed in the tax law are rare.21 Nonetheless, attitudes toward greed 
may be implicit in certain tax rules.22 It has also been made more 
explicit in certain limited areas, such as in the context of executive 
compensation.23 
 
 18. See Posner, supra note 7, at 1105–06. 
 19. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107–146, pt. 1 at 2 (2002) (“This bill would play a crucial role in 
restoring trust in the financial markets by ensuring that the corporate fraud and greed may be better 
detected, prevented and prosecuted. While greed cannot be legislated against, the federal 
government must do its utmost to ensure that such greed does not succeed.”); see also 148 CONG. 
REC., 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. 14500 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Miller) (supporting 
the measure in response to the “relentless greed” that “has led to financial ruin” for employees and 
investors in companies such as Enron and WorldCom which went bankrupt in the wake of massive 
financial frauds). 
 20. See Posner, supra note 7, at 1106.; see also LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 
AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT ch. 13 (1914) (describing “combinations” or mergers of railroad 
companies as motivated by greed or personal ambition in an essay on the “Curse of Bigness”). This 
raises a fundamental, definitional question with respect to greed: what is “too much”? 
 21. For example, greed has been cited as a justification for enhanced penalties for tax 
avoidance. See Roben v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 407 (1986). One reason for the paucity of 
references towards greed in the tax law is that motive or intent is only occasionally relevant to 
questions of taxation. Another reason is because of the emphasis in tax policy on efficiency—that 
tax rules should not distort the economic choices that taxpayers would otherwise make, regardless 
of the morality of those choices. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENCK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 29 (6th ed. 2009). 
 22. See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes 
Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 167 (1994). 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
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The role of tax policy in the economic life of a country and the 
issues surrounding the allocation of the tax burden raise complex 
questions that strike to the heart of the country’s moral, political, and 
economic traditions and views on wealth and greed. Greed has been 
described as the impetus for a compulsory tax system: the payment of 
taxes must be compelled by any government in order to sustain itself, 
since systems of voluntary payment fall victim to the human tendency 
toward free-riding.24 
So what, then, is the point of looking at greed with respect to tax 
policy? In the epigraphs at the beginning of this Article, two 
politicians make very distinct statements about greed. In one, which is 
characteristic of left-leaning populist attitudes, greed is explicitly 
linked to insufficient taxation. The other epigraph exemplifies a 
different popular view, that “greed” (but more accurately referring to 
self-interest) may in fact be good. This perspective is also common 
among libertarian groups that tend to take a skeptical view of taxation. 
Both cases illustrate the rhetorical strength of greed as a concept 
touching upon very deep-seated beliefs and values. Greed is 
potentially a powerful political and rhetorical tool. Tax policy makers 
should consider greed in formulating tax policy that resonates with the 
public, as “greed” can signal moral outrage about a distribution or 
behavior that violates norms of fairness and justice. Analytical rigor is 
necessary, however, to avoid limiting the scenarios where self-
interested behavior can be a positive force, as in the case of an 
entrepreneur driven by material self-interest to create social wealth.25 
Before defining greed, however, it is necessary to survey the 
historical evolution of the varying conceptions of greed, and explore 
how greed works in practice. The following sections will address each 
of these in turn. 
B.  The Historical Evolution of the Concept of Greed 
Greed is ubiquitous in human history. From ancient religious 
texts to the Greek philosophers, greed is discussed and, generally, 
 
 24. See Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian 
Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671, 680 (2006) (“The law must compel the payment of taxes because 
most people, due to the human tendency towards greed, would never pay their share voluntarily.”). 
 25. Entrepreneurship and wealth creation may be motivated by what is colloquially referred 
to as greed, but profit-motivated self-interest is not always the sole or primary driver of innovation 
or wealth creation. See, e.g., ERIC VON HIPPEL, FREE INNOVATION 145 (2016) (discussing a range 
of motivators for innovation, including creativity, fun, altruism, and learning). 
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condemned. Per one commentator, “[i]n every era, there have been 
people who had an excessive desire to accumulate money, power, and 
prestige.”26 In the Judeo-Christian tradition, greed is considered one 
of the seven deadly sins,27 with warnings against avarice and an 
excessive emphasis on worldly possession appearing throughout the 
Bible.28 In Buddhism, greed is considered one of the “Three Poisons,” 
one of the unwholesome motivations that contributes to human 
suffering.29 Generally speaking, in religious and moral teachings, 
greed is something which must be reined in, controlled, or subverted.30 
King Midas was blinded by his greed and turned everything he loved 
into gold, thus losing it forever.31 More recently, “unbridled greed” 
has been condemned as the cause of corporate scandals.32 
In Western culture, the early Christian and Biblical teachings on 
greed persisted through the Middle Ages.33 With the growth of a larger 
merchant class, however, universal condemnation of greed became 
increasingly problematic—how can one eschew material wealth, when 
more and more people are benefiting from activities that generate 
material wealth? This problem is reflected in the evolution of thinking 
on money and wealth over time: from the early Christian writings 
praising asceticism and condemning greed, popular and scholarly 
thought became significantly more nuanced. For example, 
Shakespeare’s well-known sixteenth century play The Merchant of 
 
 26. Linda Stern, Economy: The Human History of Greed, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://www.newsweek.com/economy-human-history-greed-76435 (quoting RYAN K. BALOT, 
GREED AND INJUSTICE IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. See ANGELA TILBY, THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS: THEIR ORIGIN IN THE SPIRITUAL 
TEACHING OF EVGARIUS THE HERMIT (2009). 
 28. See, e.g., Ecclesiastes 5:9 (“The covetous man is never satisfied with money, and the lover 
of wealth reaps no fruit from it.”); Luke 12:15 (New American Bible Revised Edition) (“Then he 
said to the crowd, ‘Take care to guard against all greed, for though one may be rich, one’s life does 
not consist of possessions.’”). 
 29. See DAVID R. LOY, The Three Poisons, Institutionalized, in SPIRITUALITY AND 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: INTERPENETRATING WORLDS (David Bubna-Litic ed., 
2009). 
 30. See, e.g., SALLY MCFAGUE, God’s Household: Christianity, Economics, and Planetary 
Living, in SUBVERTING GREED: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 119 (Paul 
F. Knitter & Chandra Muzaffar, eds., 2002). 
 31. Anna Baldwin, Midas, ENCYCLOPEDIA MYTHICA, (Mar. 3, 1997), http://www.pantheon 
.org/articles/m/midas.html. 
 32. See, e.g., Opinion, Unbridled Greed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2003), http://www.ny 
times.com/2003/03/25/opinion/unbridled-greed.html?mcubz=0; see also Wang & Murnighan, 
supra note 13. 
 33. See E. K. HUNT, PROPERTY AND PROPHETS: THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES 11 (7th ed. 2003). 
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Venice seems to reflect this dual thinking on making money: 
merchants are not inherently bad people—one can make money and 
still be a good, humble, and loyal person (as in the form of the 
character Antonio), but where money is valued too much, it is a vice 
(as in the character Shylock, the usurer).34 By the mid-eighteenth 
century, thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as, David Hume 
and Adam Smith, defended the value of protecting private property 
and proclaimed that self-interested behavior promotes societal good 
through the promotion of trade and industry.35 These views 
distinguished morally objectionable greed from the self-interested, 
materialistic preferences of the modern economic man now heralded 
as a model citizen. 
These Scottish Enlightenment views were imported into the 
American political, economic and moral tradition of what Professor 
Kornhauser calls “moral economic individualism”—rooted in the 
Protestant religious and moral teachings, the idea that every Christian 
had two “callings”: first and generally, to lead a godly life, and more 
specifically, that each person through his vocation would serve God 
by serving the common good.36 As Kornhauser has explained: 
According to [the socialist and philosopher Max] Weber, the 
Calvinist doctrines of election and predestination provided 
the impetus to work and the “spirit” of capitalism: under 
these doctrines only some people were chosen for salvation, 
and the decision as to who would be saved was 
predetermined by God. Because doubting whether a person 
was chosen was considered to be a lack of faith, one was 
duty-bound to act as if she were one of the elect. This 
occurred through one’s special calling—by working hard and 
accumulating wealth for the glory of God . . . Thus, wealth 
became a sign of grace: God created man to work, and 
 
 34. See Posner, supra note 7, at 1097–98. Even Shakespeare’s perspective seems to reflect 
some ambivalence: Antonio may be a wealthy merchant and a sympathetic character, but one does 
not envy him, as his wealth and position clearly have not made him happy. Shylock’s attachment 
to money may derive in some way from his persecution as a Jew and mistreatment by the wealthy 
Christians of Venice: the pleasures of material wealth are his only antidote to the injustices to which 
he feels subjected. 
 35. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS IV.ii.9 456 (Liberty Classics 1981) 
(1776). 
 36. See Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 125. 
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through work, rather than leisure or idleness, man glorified 
God.37 
Nonetheless, Kornhauser acknowledges that in the American 
tradition, pursuit of wealth for its own sake, or for consumption’s sake, 
is morally suspect.38 Only wealth attained as a byproduct of hard work 
and dedication to one’s calling is morally sound. Therein lies the 
tension: wealth is encouraged as the fruit of performance of duty, but 
ethically bad as a temptation to idleness or sinful enjoyment of life, or 
where not properly “earned.”39 Thus, in the American Protestant 
tradition, the critical connotations of “greed” must relate only to the 
desire to accumulate wealth for wealth’s own sake, or for the sake of 
consumption or attainment of other worldly benefits, divorced from 
the communitarianism of the culture, wherein individual industry and 
the pursuit of wealth is viewed as benefiting the common good. These 
views on wealth accumulation under the Protestant tradition are also 
tempered in American moral economic individualism by 
Republicanism, which sought to establish a nation governed by 
independent citizens rather than a system of monarchy or 
aristocracy.40 Under this ideology, widespread ownership of property 
is necessary, but the accumulation of wealth in the hands of few is 
dangerous to the very basis of the Republic.41 
Moral economic individualism continues to play a role in the 
American political psyche and creates an inherent tension and 
complexity in American attitudes toward greed. As political and 
economic cycles come and go, popular and political sentiments 
fluctuate, and at different times in history, the prevailing attitudes 
toward greed may color political discourse and policy-making. For 
example, in the late 1800s, the rise of the great industrial trusts and 
other social changes inspired the Progressive and Populist political 
 
 37. Id. (citing MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 
(Talcott Parsons trans., 2d ed. 1976) (internal citations omitted)). 
 38. Id. at 126. 
 39. This concept that wealth should be “earned” has a corollary in equity theory in psychology, 
that people tend to view an output fairly if it has some correlation with the inputs that resulted in 
the output in question. Thus, where wealth is proper compensation for an input, be that labor, 
capital, risk, or a combination of inputs, that wealth will be viewed as “fair” and morally acceptable. 
See, e.g., Sheffrin, supra note 4, at 39. 
 40. Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 127. 
 41. Id. (citing GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 233–34 
(1992)). 
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movements of the period.42 In a Senate debate on legislation aimed at 
curtailing the growth of trusts, Democratic Senator James Jones of 
Arkansas stated that the success of the trusts was “an example of evil 
that has excited the greed and conscienceless rapacity of commercial 
sharks.”43 More recently, popular discussion and the media have 
taunted and condemned the “greedy” behavior of fraudsters such as 
Bernie Madoff.44 
While those who commit financial fraud may be easy targets for 
the label “greedy,” there does not appear to be a universally agreed-
upon line between morally reprehensible greed and wealth-
maximizing self-interest. This paradox reflects the dual conception of 
greed as something that is at once a vice and also merely an extreme 
form of self-interested behavior that nearly all humans exhibit. An 
analysis of how people behave in economic situations in practice helps 
explore this paradox and may assist in drawing the line between 
greedy excess and acceptable (even desirable) economic self-interest. 
Part C below provides this analysis. 
C.  Greed in Practice 
1.  Are People Inherently Greedy? 
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith tells us that the individual 
working in his own economic self-interest is “led by an invisible hand 
to promote an end which was no part of his intention,” and that this 
end, ultimately, is the public good.45 And yet, Smith acknowledged 
that people were also influenced by impulses other than their own 
economic well-being: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, 
there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him, 
in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.”46 
Thus, in addition to selfish impulses, people are also driven by a 
propensity to sympathize with their fellow humans, as well as by what 
 
 42. Id. at 136. 
 43. 20 CONG. REC. 1457, 1458 (1899). 
 44. See, e.g., American Greed: Madoff Behind Bars (CNBC broadcast Aug. 25, 2010); 
Susannah Cahalan, A Look Inside the Heartless, Miserable, Greedy, Vain World of the Madoffs, 
N.Y. POST (Oct. 30, 2011), http://nypost.com/2011/10/30/a-look-inside-the-heartless-miserable-
greedy-vain-world-of-the-madoffs/. 
 45. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 572 (Bantam Classics 2003) (1776). 
 46. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 13 (Enhanced Media Publishing 
2016) (1759). 
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Smith refers to as the conscience.47 This is similar to David Hume’s 
view of human nature, which he described as made up of “ambition, 
avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these 
passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through 
society . . . .”48 Nonetheless, there is a view that Smith (and probably 
Hume, as well) had a “pretty low opinion of mankind, in general.”49 
But Smith also firmly believed that the less agreeable qualities of man, 
such as avarice or self-interest, could be productive of good, since, for 
example, self-interest promoted industry.50 
Smith’s views of human nature were embraced and elaborated 
upon by later economists, with increasing acceptance of the view that 
market participants are primarily motivated by self-interest.51 
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that market participants are 
rational profit maximizers.52 Some proponents of the law and 
economics school of thought have incorporated this model into their 
thinking on the role of intent in the law, and essentially take the view 
that because greed motivates all market participants, spurs 
competition, and promotes overall wellbeing, it has no role in legal 
inquiry.53 This view, however conflates wealth-maximizing self-
interest with greed, and does not distinguish between the two. 
Even rephrasing Judge Easterbrook’s and Judge Posner’s “greed” 
as self-interest, the dogma of the free market and self-interested actors 
does not necessarily comport with reality. Economic historian Karl 
Polanyi argued that 
Nineteenth-century thinkers assumed that in his economic 
activity man strove for profit, that his materialistic 
propensities would induce him to choose the lesser instead of 
the greater effort and to expect payment for his labor . . . . 
Actually, as we now know, the behavior of man both in his 
 
 47. See R. H. Coase, Adam Smith’s View of Man, 19 J. L. & ECON. 529, 529–32 (1976). 
 48. Id. at 540 (citing DAVID HUME, Human Uniformity and Predictability, in THE SCOTTISH 
MORALISTS ON HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIETY 44 (Louis Schneider ed., 1967)). 
 49. Id. at 543 (citing Arthur H. Cole, Puzzles of the “Wealth of Nations”, 24 CANADIAN J. 
ECON. & POL. SCI. 1, 5 (1958)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8 J. L., ECON. & POL’Y 801, 818 (2012) (citing 
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 931 (1979)). 
 52. Id. at 818–19. 
 53. Id. at 820 (citing Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc., 241 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 2001); Kumpf v. 
Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323, 1326 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
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primitive state and right through the course of history has 
been almost the opposite from that implied in this view.54 
Qualitative experiments have backed up this view. For example, 
some economists have shown that profit-maximizing self-interest may 
in fact be a primary motivator only in a minority of cases.55 Recent 
work by behavioral economists, using controlled laboratory and field 
experiments, has demonstrated that people are sufficiently motivated 
by considerations other than their own profit that they often behave in 
ways quite contrary to the traditional rational wealth-maximizing 
model.56 The evidence suggests that people care about fairness, and 
that the impulsion toward reciprocity in human behavior is so strong 
that they tend to act cooperatively rather than selfishly most of the 
time.57 
Two classic economic experiments illustrate these findings. The 
first is the “ultimatum game” in which individuals are randomly and 
anonymously assigned into pairs and asked to divide up a sum of 
money.58 One individual, the “proposer,” must offer a particular 
division of the money to the “responder,” who may then accept the 
offer, in which case each player gets the agreed-upon sum, or reject it, 
in which case neither player receives anything. Economic analysis 
based on the model of the self-interested rational actor would suggest 
that the responder will accept any proposal, since receiving something 
is always better than nothing. However, across hundreds of ultimatum 
game experiments, it was found that responders routinely reject offers 
of less than 20% of the available funds.59 Further, the probability of 
rejection decreased as the sum offered by the proposer increased.60 
 
 54. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 257–58 (2d ed. 2001); see, e.g., FRED BLOCK & MARGARET R. SOMERS, 
Beyond the Economistic Fallacy: The Holistic Social Science of Karl Polanyi, in VISION AND 
METHOD IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 63 (Theda Skocpol ed., 1984) (“Only in the nineteenth-
century self-regulating market did economic self-interest become the dominant principle of social 
life . . . .”). 
 55. Stucke, supra note 51, at 822 (“Most people, however, are not predictably greedy.”). 
 56. Id. at 822–23. 
 57. Id. at 823; see also Yochai Benkler, The Unselfish Gene, 89 HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 
2011, at 79 (“In no society examined under controlled conditions have the majority of people 
consistently behaved selfishly.”). 
 58. See Werner Guth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 370 (1982). 
 59. See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Why Social Preferences Matter-The Impact of Non-
Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives, 112 ECON. J. C1, C5 (2002). 
 60. Id. 
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The second experiment is the so-called “dictator game.” It is 
similar to the ultimatum game in that it involves two randomly 
assigned players who are given a sum of money to divide.61 In the 
dictator game, however, the proposer has full control; in other words, 
the proposer is a dictator.62 The other player must accept whatever is 
offered by the dictator.63 Economic analysis would suggest that the 
dictator would offer nothing or next to nothing.64 However, that was 
not the result.65 Instead, over a range of experiments, usually more 
than sixty percent of dictators would offer a positive amount of money 
to the other player, and the mean transfer was roughly twenty percent 
of the funds available.66 While there are varying interpretations of the 
results of dictator game experiments, it is generally agreed that the 
experiment shows people do not always seek to maximize payoffs.67 
A comparison of the ultimatum and dictator games shows that 
actors tend to anticipate their counterparties’ reactions to offers that 
may be perceived as unfair. Where the second player has the option to 
reject the offer in the ultimatum game, initial offers tend to be 
significantly higher than in the dictator game.68 This may reflect some 
self-interested behavior on the part of the proposer, who anticipates 
that if the responder does not view the offer as fair, there is a greater 
risk of rejection. However, the dictator game shows that it is not pure 
profit maximization that drives positive offers in the ultimatum game, 
and there seems to be some element of an inherent sense of fairness or 
altruism evidenced by the dictator game. One explanation for this is 
the theory of inequity aversion, which posits that individuals have an 
inherent dislike of inequitable outcomes.69 However, there is also 
some evidence that concepts of fairness are impacted by the context in 
 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. (“In a Dictator Game the responder’s option to reject is removed–the responder must 
accept any proposal.”). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Robert Forsythe et al., Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments, 6 GAMES & ECON. 
BEHAV. 347, 348 (1994). 
 65. John A. List, On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games, 115 J. POL. ECON. 482, 
483 (2007). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 483–84. 
 68. Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 59, at C5. 
 69. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, 
114 Q. J. ECON. 817, 819 (1999). 
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which the interaction occurs, and also have societal and cultural 
components.70 This will be discussed further in the next part. 
In sum, the ultimatum and dictator games show that humans are 
not universally motivated by the self-interested desire for wealth, 
profit or material gains, and have deep-seated notions of fairness and 
acceptable social and economic behavior. Certainly, self-interested 
profit motives may be important in driving behavior that benefits 
society by incentivizing wealth maximization that improves overall 
welfare (the idea suggested above that greed can “do good”).71 But 
when selfish materialism comes at the expense of others or is 
somehow excessive or contrary to societal norms, it can actually work 
against self-interest: people are willing to punish others for unfair 
behavior.72 This reaffirms that greed is not equivalent to self-interest 
and involves the violation of certain societal norms of justice and 
fairness.73 It also indicates that people may approve of using tax policy 
either to punish or correct greedy behavior, as will be explored further 
below. 
2.  A Note on the Malleability of Greed 
As noted in some of the work on the ultimatum and dictator 
games, there is significant evidence that cooperative and “fair” 
behavior has a learned or emotional component, and that attitudes 
towards greed, as well as fairness, are malleable and can be 
cultivated.74 Education, religion, and political institutions can 
incentivize or acculturate greedy behavior, or promote and reward 
cooperation and fairness.75 Cross-cultural studies using the ultimatum 
game have shown that greater “market integration” and higher profits 
from cooperation tend to be associated with more cooperation in the 
 
 70. See STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, TAX FAIRNESS AND FOLK JUSTICE 41 (2013); see also List, 
supra note 65, at 490. 
 71. See Rollert, supra note 17 
 72. Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 801, 823 (2012) (“This 
‘strong reciprocity’ in human behavior entails a ‘predisposition to cooperate with others and to 
punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to 
expect that these costs will be repaid either by others or at a later date.’”). 
 73. This will be explored further in Part 0, infra. 
 74. See Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, 7 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 159, 161 (1993); see also Benkler, supra note 57. 
 75. See Frank et al., supra note 74 (discussing studies showing that education in the field of 
economics can change attitudes towards greed). Certainly, religious teachings have almost 
universally sought to contain or limit greedy tendencies. See supra Part 0. 
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experimental games, or in other words, with a sense of fairness that 
requires more sharing.76 
In contrast, many have noted that the institutions of capitalism—
and the free market economy in particular—tend to cultivate and 
reinforce impulses toward greed.77 Evidence from the cross-cultural 
ultimatum game may in part explain this: whereas capitalism is often 
attended by market integration and cooperation through trade that 
would be expected to heighten senses of fairness, the size and 
anonymity of large markets may reduce this impulse. This is not to say 
that global capitalism is doomed to reward the greedy. Work in the 
field of behavioral economics, as well as work in ethical management 
and other areas,78 are making the case that “we can build efficient 
systems by relying on our better selves rather than optimizing for our 
worst.”79 This should inform tax policy, as well: tax rules that tend to 
reward and promote fairness and cooperation can reinforce public 
perceptions of fairness in the tax system. 
In addition to remedying injustice caused by greedy behavior, tax 
policy may have a role in acculturating fair behavior in society, by 
condemning unfair, greedy behavior. Of course, this should be done 
cautiously, especially in light of the power of greed as a rhetorical tool. 
As the experimental evidence shows, what is considered “fair” can 
vary situationally, so it is important to keep such nuances in mind in 
crafting tax policy. As Sheffrin, John List, and others have noted, 
results in the ultimatum and dictator games and similar experiments 
emphasize the importance of context. In the anonymous construct of 
the basic ultimatum game, the proposer may be motivated by a 
combination of self-interest, the desire to ensure that the responder 
accepts the offer, inherent inequality aversion, and perhaps a sense of 
being responsible for someone who did not receive the power and 
 
 76. Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 
Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73, 73–74 (2001). 
 77. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Greed Among American Lawyers, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
611, 616 (2005) (citing David P. Levine, The Attachment of Greed to Self-Interest, 2 
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUD. 131, 139 (2000)). 
 78. Professor Lynn Stout and others have also done significant work incorporating the work 
of behavioral economists and revitalized concepts of business ethics into the fields of corporate 
governance, law and economics, securities regulation, and corporate finance, among others. See, 
e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 
28 J. OF CORP. L. 635 (2003); Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation As Time Machine: Intergenerational 
Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015). 
 79. Benkler, supra note 57, at 80. 
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money allocated to the proposer at random.80 Modifications to the 
dictator game, however, for example in which there was some aspect 
of the dictator having “earned” the income in question, significantly 
reduced the sharing that had been seen to occur in the pure dictator 
game studies.81 Thus, tax policy aimed at limiting greedy behavior 
must be carefully crafted so as not to offend notions of fairness 
depending on the context in which the rules apply.82 
D.  Greed as a Rhetorical and Analytical Device in Tax Policy 
As one expert has stated, “A tax system is not simply a device for 
redistributing goods and services with the least social pain. It is also a 
system in which individuals express their values. Tax reforms that 
reflect these values are more likely to endure.”83 Tax policy is at the 
core of the system of government in American liberal democracy. It is 
thus a reflection of, as well as at times a challenge to, the value system 
of American society.84 Concepts of justice and fairness, including 
attitudes toward greed, are reflected in current tax policy. And yet, 
there has been very little explicit analysis of such concepts in 
normative tax policy discussions. 
In pluralistic democracy, there is no uniform set of values to 
which everyone adheres. There are general principles that drive our 
constitutional political system, but there is deep disagreement on 
numerous aspects of political philosophy, the role of government, and 
ideal tax policy. Nonetheless, recent work in the fields of economics 
and psychology indicates that there may be unifying trends in human 
thought and behavior: as a review of the ultimatum and dictator game 
literature shows, people seem to have an innate sense of fairness, a 
willingness to punish those who breach social norms, and at least some 
measure of concern for others that refutes classical depictions of homo 
 
 80. See, e.g., List, supra note 65, at 491 (discussing his conclusions that the anonymous and 
random pairings in the dictator game may be analogous to random incidents in the real world where 
we are put in a position of responsibility vis-à-vis a stranger, for example, helping an old lady cross 
the street, in which our behavior would accord with the social norms evident in the dictator game 
context, but noting that his modifications to the dictator game, which introduced components of 
earning and taking into the experimental setting, altered the results dramatically, generally resulting 
in less sharing). 
 81. See Sheffrin, supra note 4, at 41–42. 
 82. See infra Part 0 (discussing the idea of “earned” outcomes, and the relationship between 
greed and concepts of fairness). 
 83. Sheffrin, supra note 4, at 225. 
 84. See generally Kornhauser, supra note 22 (discussing how the income tax system reflects 
American values and society’s sometimes conflicting attitudes towards wealth and money). 
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economicus as a purely profit-maximizing creature.85 These findings 
have important lessons for tax policy, and will also aid in the 
development of a definition of greed, as will be discussed in Part III, 
below. 
As noted above, greed is a powerful rhetorical tool, often invoked 
in politics to garner public outrage against some event or favoritism 
for a certain policy.86 Rhetoric can be used to argue for or against a 
particular proposal, but it also can frame the way people think about 
an issue going forward. Framing certain behavior using the rhetoric of 
greed may influence how people view the issue.87 Mental and 
rhetorical framing of an issue to drum up support for or opposition to 
a policy or rule may be problematic, in that it can result in a law or 
policy that is politically expedient rather than effective.88 Nonetheless, 
it may be beneficial to use rhetorical and framing devices to achieve 
tax policies that are effective and fair. Limiting or regulating greed, as 
the term is defined in Part III below, through the tax laws may, in fact, 
be efficient from an administrative perspective, as it does not require 
any new administrative vehicle for regulation.89 Of course, this must 
be done carefully in order to ensure that the focus on administrative 
efficiency does not disguise other problems with a rule or law, such as 
the creation of unexpected and costly externalities, when a different 
 
 85. One psychologist makes the case that in fact, homo economicus is just one of three 
competing conceptions of human motivation, together with homo socialis, which is concerned with 
human relationships and social goals such as status and standing, as well as homo moralis, which 
focuses on people’s core conceptions of right and wrong. Linda J. Skitka et al., Knitting Together 
an Elephant: An Integrative Approach to Understanding the Psychology of Justice Reasoning, in 
11 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE AND LEGITIMACY: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 1, 2 (D.R. 
Bobocel et al. eds., 2009). All three of these motivate human behavior at different times and in 
different contexts. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., LAWRENCE W. REED, EXCUSE ME PROFESSOR: CHALLENGING THE MYTHS OF 
PROGRESSIVISM 23–24 (Lawrence W. Reed ed. 2015) (referring to charges of greed with respect 
to the 2008 financial crisis as “little more than a rhetorical device”). 
 87. David I. Walker has discussed the use of mental and rhetorical framing of business 
deductions as subsidies as an effective but potentially misleading tool to shape the debate around 
Internal Revenue Code provisions that deny deductions in various contexts. See, e.g., David I. 
Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions in a Net Income Tax System, 52 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1247 (2011). 
 88. Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1905–16 (1994) 
(stating that “Framing” refers to the well-documented phenomenon under which individuals react 
to the purely formal way in which a question is presented or “framed,” and discussing numerous 
examples of how framing is used in the Tax Code). 
 89. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 
113 YALE L.J. 955, 958 (2012) (remarking on the administrative advantages of using the Tax Code 
to regulate corporate governance and similar behavior, and to minimize deadweight loss). 
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approach could have avoided such unintended effects.90 The limited 
approach to taxing greed discussed in Part IV, infra, attempts to 
achieve this. 
III.  WHAT IS GREED? 
In order to make rules relating to greed, one must first define it. 
This Article will engage in an inquiry to delineate a conception of 
greed that is capable of broad acceptance. In a democratic society, any 
rule relating to greed should be one that is acceptable to, and 
presumably desired by, a majority of the people. Few rules, including 
tax laws, have unanimous support in a pluralistic democracy, but 
sufficient consensus must exist for a rule to become law.91 
Furthermore, in order to make lasting and workable policy, rules must 
be acceptable to a broad enough coalition to avoid attack, avoidance, 
and prompt repeal as political fortunes wax and wane.92 
The American Heritage Dictionary defines “greed” as “an 
excessive desire to acquire or possess more than what one needs or 
deserves, especially with respect to material wealth.”93 This definition, 
with its reference to “what one needs or deserves,” highlights the fact 
that greed is bound up with concepts of morality, fairness, and 
economics. It also emphasizes the importance of the concept of desert, 
and the idea that greed constitutes seeking to obtain or feeling entitled 
to material gain that is not earned—where the inputs do not justify the 
outputs. Thus, an exploration of the philosophical underpinnings of 
morality, fairness, and economics, with a focus on the concept of 
“excess” and the distinction between earned and unearned, is 
necessary. This section will address these points. 
 
 90. See generally Walker, supra note 87 (discussing the difficulties created by using denial of 
tax deductions to achieve certain corporate governance and similar regulatory goals). 
 91. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xvi (Columbia Univ. Press 1993) (“Political 
liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible 
comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework 
of the free institutions of  a constitutional democratic regime.”). In light of this plurality of 
reasonable yet incompatible doctrines, it is necessary to find an “overlapping consensus” in order 
to coexist in society. Id. at xix. 
 92. A discussion of the political, moral and philosophical foundations and realities of 
lawmaking in our constitutional democracy is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, the 
author expects that the foregoing statements are more or less unobjectionable to most readers of 
this Article. See also Sheffrin, supra note 4, at 53–58 (discussing the role of popular notions of 
fairness and justice in normative tax policy). 
 93. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2015). 
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A.  Philosophical Underpinnings of Greed 
Greed, as a concept with a close relationship to economic 
behavior, and with social and moral aspects rooted in religious and 
philosophical teachings, may be viewed differently, or even defined 
differently, depending on one’s philosophical, political, and moral 
perspective. Thus, a survey of the various philosophical traditions and 
how they view greed follows. This Article will then attempt to derive 
a definition of greed that should satisfy the majority of these traditions. 
The various philosophical traditions may best be viewed as falling 
along a spectrum: at one extreme, “greed”, however defined, is 
morally valid and need not be sanctioned. In a philosophical tradition 
that essentially says every person has the right to whatever he or she 
wants, anything that he or she is able to take becomes his or hers by 
right. This might describe the anarchic state of nature set forth in 
Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan;94 thus, a view that the state of nature was 
“good” or “just” might not see any behavior as greedy or consider 
greed as “bad”.95 Nearly all philosophical traditions reject this view, 
but it nonetheless marks one extreme on the spectrum of attitudes 
towards greed. On the opposite end of the spectrum, one might view 
the only just society as one in which every person has equal rights to 
all the goods and benefits in the world. Thus, any attempt to take more 
than one’s fair share, or in other words, to gain or acquire more than 
the next person, would be viewed as greedy. I will refer to this view 
as “pure outcome egalitarianism,” where each person can be no better 
off economically than the next person without offending pure outcome 
egalitarianism. Between these two extremes lie numerous other 
perspectives that each may define greed differently. 
1.  Rawls’s Qualified Outcome Egalitarianism 
Down the spectrum from pure outcome egalitarianism is the 
Rawlsian tradition, an egalitarian tradition based on the liberal 
philosophy of John Rawls, which does not advocate full equality of 
outcomes, but rather promotes a qualified view of equal outcomes, or 
 
 94. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Pac. Publ’g Studio 2011) (1651). 
 95. It is worth noting that Hobbes would not have ascribed to such a view; he viewed the state 
of nature as so bad that it justified a monarchic system of government based on a social contract. 
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XVII. 
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what I will refer to as qualified outcome egalitarianism.96 In Rawls’s 
conception of justice, as set forth in his foundational book A Theory of 
Justice, inequalities must benefit all.97 Whether social and economic 
equalities benefit all is determined by the difference principle: remove 
inequalities in society up to the point where any more removal would 
harm the least advantaged.98 Rawls not only rejects what he calls legal 
inequality (i.e., inequality imposed by the legal regime, for example, 
a rule that only people from a certain neighborhood could obtain 
certain advantaged positions in society or the economy), but he also 
calls for a system that would eliminate what may be termed birth 
inequality and insists that any remaining social inequalities benefit the 
least advantaged.99 
Rawls’s theory is premised on the assumption that individuals in 
a hypothetical “original position,” in choosing a system of justice, will 
first pick maximum equal political liberty.100 Second, while in the 
original position, individuals cannot know ex ante where they will fall 
in the distribution of income, so they will choose the distribution in 
which the poorest are better off than in any other position (the “maxi-
min” principle).101 This “veil of ignorance” in the original position 
neutralizes self-interest, causing the rational individual to select as just 
a distribution in which inequality was acceptable, but only insofar as 
it did not disadvantage the least well-off.102 Thus, a Rawlsian 
conception of greed would involve violation of the maxi-min 
principle: a greedy act might involve acquiring or holding something 
while knowing that such acquisition or holding fails to maximize (in 
other words, disadvantages) the least well-off. This is a fairly abstract 
conception of greed, but we will return to it in Part IV. 
 
 96. Some have referred to this as factor-based or factor-selective equality of outcomes. See, 
e.g., Marc Fleurbay, Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?, 11 ECON. & PHIL. 25, 25–26 
(1995). 
 97. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 65 (1971) (hereinafter, RAWLS, JUSTICE). 
 98. Utilitarians and some libertarians in contrast might choose the pareto efficiency principle: 
remove inequalities only up to the point that they create inefficiencies. 
 99. As will be discussed below, libertarians would view this as an intolerable infringement on 
liberty. 
 100. See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 97, at 123–24 (ranking the principles of justice). 
 101. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 5–6 (1993). 
 102. RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 97, at 303. 
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2.  A Nozickian/Libertarian Conception of Greed 
Moving towards the center of the spectrum from the hypothetical 
extreme in which nothing is considered greedy, falls what I term the 
Nozickian or libertarian conception of greed. The libertarian view of 
justice, as most famously articulated by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, 
State and Utopia, essentially holds that the outcome of any lawful 
transaction is just.103 This conception of libertarianism does not allow 
the state to interfere in the private market unless the state’s action 
serves to correct a past injustice.104 Accordingly, Nozick views any 
compulsory tax system as suspect, since the role of the state is limited 
and revenue needs are minimal—a voluntary or benefits-based tax 
may arguably be acceptable.105 In this conception, greed is acceptable 
so long as it does not motivate or cause illegal behavior. Thus, any 
conception of greed that could be sanctioned by the tax system, in the 
libertarian view, would require illegality. No “tax” on greed would be 
just except insofar as it transfers illegally-gotten gains to those who 
were harmed by a prior illegal transaction. 
3.  Utilitarianism, Wealth Maximization, and the Middle Ground 
A whole range of viewpoints on greed could fall on the scale 
between Rawlsian and Nozickian conceptions of greed. One of the 
most prominent theories of justice and taxation over the past several 
hundred years is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, first promoted by 
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, generally holds that the moral 
worth of an action (or of a practice, institution, law, etc.) is to be 
judged by its effect in promoting happiness—“the surplus of pleasure 
over pain”—aggregated across all of the inhabitants of a society.106 In 
terms of tax justice, in his book Principles of Political Economy, John 
Stuart Mill argued for equality of sacrifice as a guiding principle: 
If any one bears less than his fair share of the burthen, some 
other person must suffer more than his share, and the 
alleviation to the one is not, cæteris paribus, so great a good 
to him, as the increased pressure upon the other is an evil. 
 
 103. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 151 (Blackwell 1999) (1974). 
 104. Id. at 151–52; see also Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on 
Taxation: What Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991, 2001 (2004). 
 105. See NOZICK, supra note 103, at 169 (comparing taxation of earnings to forced labor). 
 106. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 
103, 104 (1979). 
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Equality of taxation, therefore, as a maxim of politics, means 
equality of sacrifice.107 
Of course, this requires ascertaining what constitutes a person’s fair 
share. Nonetheless, it tells us that a utilitarian conception of greed in 
the Millsian tradition might begin with a statement to the effect that a 
greedy person is one who knowingly seeks to carry less than his fair 
share of the burden. 
What might constitute a “fair share?” Taking a closer look at the 
principle of equal sacrifice, Mill’s premise seems to have been that 
“government ought to make no distinction of persons or classes in the 
strength of their claims on it . . .”, such that any required sacrifice 
“should be made to bear as nearly as possible with the same pressure 
upon all, which . . . is the mode by which the least sacrifice is 
occasioned on the whole.”108 Following Mill, Thomas Carver later 
argued that Mill had erred in his utilitarian analysis.109 According to 
Carver, Mill’s articulation of the equal sacrifice principle did not yield 
the “least sacrifice” overall, because of the theory of “marginal 
utility.”110 Marginal utility holds that a dollar is worth less to the high 
income earner than the low income earner, and thus, the high income 
earner can afford to give up more than the low income earner. 
However, later utilitarian thinkers have been unable to agree on how 
to measure equal sacrifice, with some approaches using marginal 
equal sacrifice and others preferring absolute equal sacrifice, or even 
equal proportional sacrifice.111 
Thus, while Mills seems to have assumed that each person in a 
society is accorded equal weight, and thus individual variation in 
utility or welfare is discounted, other utilitarian theories take into 
account the concept of declining marginal utility. Utilitarian positions, 
thus, may fall on a spectrum themselves. Among the least egalitarian 
would be the utilitarian theory in which each individual’s utility is 
accorded equal weight and so distribution is unimportant as long as 
overall social welfare (the sum of each individual’s welfare) is 
 
 107. JOHN S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS 
TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 804 (W.J. Ashley ed., Longmans, Green, and Co. 1909) (1848). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Jeffrey Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical 
Bases for the Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 221, 237 (1995) (citing 
Thomas Carver, The Minimum Sacrifice Theory of Taxation, 19 POL. SCI. Q. 66, 75 (1904)). 
 110. Thomas Carver, The Minimum Sacrifice Theory of Taxation, 19 POL. SCI. Q. 66, 73 (1904). 
 111. Schoenblum, supra note 109, at 239. 
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maximized.112 A weighted utilitarian theory, or one employing a steep 
demand curve for marginal utility, may take a slightly more egalitarian 
position.113 Thus, different variations of utilitarian theory may take 
different views on what constitutes greed, depending on how one 
measures Mill’s concept of equal sacrifice and whether one follows 
the theory of the declining marginal utility of the dollar.114 
Because utilitarianism is consequentialist, greedy behavior would 
have to be defined as something that frustrated the outcomes sought 
by utilitarianism in order to be condemned by it. Thus, intentionally 
reducing the greater good in order to improve one’s own selfish 
position could constitute greed. An example of this is provided by 
“promissory” insider trading—where an insider trades in securities 
based on material nonpublic information, and has promised (explicitly 
or implicitly) not to engage in such trading.115 The harms caused by 
this include potential harm to the company if it has reasons to prevent 
insider trading, potential increased cost of capital, and harm to the 
institution of promise-making generally (undermining confidence).116 
The benefits would be to the person who engaged in the insider trade, 
and possibly to other market participants due to “smoothing” of the 
market price for the stock in question due to the insider trade.117 
Because the benefits are likely outweighed by the social harms, this 
scenario of insider trading, which involves an element of 
misappropriation and generates externalities, could be considered 
greedy.118 
 
 112. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New 
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1949 (1987). In spite of some indications in 
his writing that Mills would give equal weight to the utility of each person, thus not making 
distinctions among individuals, it is unclear whether Mills would agree with this characterization 
of his theory. Some statements in Mills’s writing, such as his reference to the “evil” of a person 
failing to bear his share of equal sacrifice, indicate that his view on welfare and utility was 
somewhat more nuanced. 
 113. See id. 
 114. The accuracy and usefulness of the theory of the declining marginal utility of the dollar 
has been criticized and questioned. See, e.g., Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal 
Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904 (2011). 
 115. John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy and the Criminalization of Insider Trading, 2014 UTAH 
L. REV. 1, 42 (2014) (arguing that utilitarianism would condemn promissory insider trading, even 
if the practice were not illegal). 
 116. Id. at 47. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. Anderson separately addresses what he calls “misappropriation” trading, which 
involves non-insider trading on the basis of misappropriated nonpublic information, and similarly 
argues that utilitarianism would condemn this type of trading for the same reasons that promissory 
insider trading would violate the norms of utilitarianism. See id. at 31, 48. 
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4.  A Plurality of Views on Greed 
The foregoing investigation into the philosophical underpinnings 
of greed reveals that across the political spectrum and depending on 
one’s view of justice, what constitutes greedy behavior will vary along 
a similar spectrum. If there is no unified definition of greed, is it 
nonetheless possible to develop a definition that could be agreed upon 
by a majority of lawmakers, politicians, and citizens? In the first place, 
one could select a narrow definition of greed. Defining greedy 
behavior in the Nozickian tradition, as an act or acts motivated by 
economic self-interest that in fact violates established law, would not 
sanction any behavior that is not considered greedy by those at the 
other end of the spectrum. Thus, labeling a person who engages in 
outright theft for material gain as greedy would likely be 
uncontroversial. For example, no one defended Bernard Madoff from 
charges of greed when it was revealed that he carried out a massive 
Ponzi scheme. On the other hand, arguing that a wealthy CEO is 
greedy because he takes home a large salary and seeks to pay the 
minimum amount of taxes allowed by law might garner agreement 
from a Rawlsian egalitarian; but a Nozickian libertarian would surely 
disagree, as might a middle-of-the-road utilitarian.119 
Thus, a very narrow definition of greed would find common 
ground among nearly all members of a pluralistic democracy, 
including one as heterogeneous as the United States. However, a 
broader definition of greed could be politically tenable, in that it would 
satisfy enough of the relevant stakeholders to pass political muster. 
Determining what such a definition would be requires turning for a 
moment from the great political and economic philosophical traditions 
to a consideration of commonly held notions of fairness and desert. 
B.  Greed as a Breach of Fairness 
Because greed is generally described as a desire or feeling, it has 
an emotional and psychological component. Psychologist Harvey A. 
Kaplan defined greed as “the selfish desire to acquire for the sake of 
acquisition without regard for others.”120 The fact that greed is 
typically described as a desire or feeling makes it a subjective concept. 
 
 119. See infra Part IV.A (discussing greed and executive pay). 
 120. David Farrugia, Selfishness, Greed, and Counseling, 46 COUNSELING & VALUES 118, 119 
(2002) (citing Harvey A. Kaplan, Greed: A Psychoanalytical Perspective, 78 PSYCHOANALYTICAL 
REV. 505 (1991)). 
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While profit-maximizing self-interests is a natural impulse inherent in 
all people, greed is an excessive variation that takes the profit-
maximizing urge to an extreme. As Sigmund Freud once said: 
Culture has to call up every possible reinforcement in order 
to erect barriers against the aggressive instincts of men . . . 
its ideal command to love one’s neighbour as oneself . . . is 
really justified by the fact that nothing is so completely at 
variance with original human nature as this.121 
Greed is thus viewed as a human failing, a vice—a failure to 
control a natural impulse or feeling. It is the moral judgment of greed 
to which the philosophical traditions can speak, to some extent, in 
trying to ascertain what is or is not moral. But there is also a more 
visceral or instinctive component of greed. As discussed in the prior 
section, there is a broad range of views among “experts” regarding 
justice and morality, and thus it is impossible to come up with a unified 
“expert” definition of greed. Similarly, any two non-experts, if asked, 
might describe different behavior or actions as greedy. However, there 
appear to be some natural tendencies or commonalities in our views 
on what constitutes fair, as opposed to greedy, behavior. In his book 
Tax Fairness and Folk Justice, the economist Steven Sheffrin catalogs 
these “folk” or popular views on fairness, explains how they relate to 
“expert” views on morality and political and economic philosophy, 
and provides a framework for consideration of these views in policy-
making.122 
This Article incorporates Sheffrin’s discussion about folk justice 
into its framework for analyzing the role of greed in tax policy. 
Everyday attitudes toward fairness and justice are particularly 
important for tax policy because tax policy must take into account the 
often strong feelings and preconceptions of politicians, and their 
constituents, about tax rules.123 In addition, Sheffrin’s work is helpful 
in thinking about greed specifically because of what it tells us about 
perceptions of fairness and what are likely to constitute deviations 
from that standard of acceptable behavior. 
 
 121. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 40–41 (Stanley Appelbaum & 
Thomas Crofts eds., Joan Riviere trans., Dover Publications, Inv. 1994) (1930). 
 122. SHEFFRIN, supra note 4. 
 123. See id. at 10 (noting that “tax policy considerations typically are discussed with the views 
of individuals and politicians in mind and not just left to the experts”). 
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1.  Folk Justice and Greed 
Folk justice is defined in Sheffrin’s book as “the full constellation 
of attitudes that individuals hold in their daily lives about all 
dimensions of justice.”124 Folk justice is relevant in considering tax 
fairness, according to Sheffrin, because it sheds light on the frequent 
disconnect between the policies advocated by “experts” and those that 
have political salience with the populace.125 In defining greed, it is 
important to consider these “folk” views on fairness as well as expert 
views about justice, to ensure that any policies resonate with the 
populace and achieve legitimacy in a democratic system of 
government. As Sheffrin notes, unless a theory “is close enough to 
folk ideas to resonate with individuals in their everyday lives,” any 
rules or institutions built on those theories will not be easily 
incorporated into social practice.126 Similarly, institutions will, to 
some degree, embody the beliefs and practices of individuals, building 
on their ideas of folk justice; therefore, effective reform of such 
institutions must account for existing social practices and prevailing 
attitudes toward justice and fairness.127 
Sheffrin proposes five foundations of folk justice: (1) procedural 
justice, (2) equity and social exchange theory, (3) qualified 
perceptions of fairness, (4) moral mandates, and (5) system 
justification theory.128 Each of these foundational concepts are 
relevant to explaining varying attitudes towards greed, and thus are 
important to developing the definition of greed below. 
The first of the five foundations discussed by Sheffrin is 
procedural justice, which addresses the process by which rules and 
laws are made, or carried out.129 Sheffrin surveys a variety of literature 
from social psychology, legal scholarship, and compliance research 
about the importance of process and procedure to social outcomes.130 
This body of work emphasizes the need for fair and open decision-
making processes, and the opportunity to be heard.131 Procedural 
 
 124. Id. at 3. 
 125. Id. at 10. 
 126. Id. at 8. 
 127. This also relates to the discussion in Part 0 above, regarding the political legitimacy of a 
particular rule or law based on a particular philosophical tradition. 
 128. SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 28. 
 129. Id. at 30. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. at 31. 
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justice may be relevant to the issue of taxing greed, because greedy 
behavior is often hidden or disguised—for example, in the context of 
financial fraud. Thus, procedural justice tells us that people will be 
more inclined to view as greedy any behavior that involves an element 
of deception or fraud—in other words, where the greedy person 
engages in behavior that interferes with another’s decision-making 
processes.132 
Secondly, Sheffrin discusses the importance of equity and social 
exchange theory.133 Equity theory, an extension of social exchange 
theory, is based on evidence from psychological studies that people 
are more satisfied when they feel that the rewards and returns they 
receive are related to the inputs or efforts they make.134 Thus, fairness 
requires some kind of fundamental balance between inputs and 
outputs.135 This is an extension of social exchange theory, a 
sociological theory that views social behavior as an exchange of 
goods, both tangible items and intangible goods that may include 
symbols of approval and prestige.136 According to equity theory, in 
addition to seeking to maximize their net gains from social interactions 
(as in social exchange theory), individuals can form groups that 
maximize collective outcomes by evolving systems for equitable 
apportionment of resources, and to enforce norms to reward and 
punish equitable and inequitable behavior.137 
Equity theory is important to the concept of greed, because it 
speaks directly to the nature of greed, which constitutes some form of 
fundamental unfairness in social or economic exchange. Equity theory 
also requires some type of balance between outputs and efforts.138 
Greed is an affront to this, as it implies some element of getting out 
more than what was put in. This will be discussed further below in the 
discussion of the concept of desert. 
 
 132. An example would be in the context of certain types of insider trading—an insider trading 
on misappropriated information or information that he or she has promised not to trade on is seen 
as interfering with the fairness of the markets and also possibly harming the company in whose 
stock he or she trades by interfering with its process of governance. See Anderson, supra note 115, 
at 45–48. 
 133. SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 34. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. at 38. 
 136. Id. at 35 (citing George C. Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AM. J. SOC. 597, 
606 (1958)). Equity theory moderates social exchange theory by emphasizing the role of fairness 
in social exchange. Id. at 36. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 37. 
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In addition to equity and social exchange theory, Sheffrin 
explores how norms of fairness seem to be societally and situationally 
dependent, and how such norms may lead to seemingly altruistic 
behavior rather than the expected “profit”-maximizing exchange.139 
He refers to this as qualified perceptions of fairness, noting that 
“fairness reflexes are not as hardwired and simplistic,” but nonetheless 
play an important role in perceptions of justice.140 As evidence, he 
cites numerous economic studies showing that people may have an 
aversion to inequity, and may also seek some kind of reciprocity in 
exchanges.141 However, ideas of fairness are affected by societal and 
situational factors.142 Studies have found differences across cultures in 
conceptions of justice and how people behave towards one another.143 
Individuals often hold strong moral positions—what Sheffrin 
calls moral mandates144—that may further influence what is viewed as 
fair or just, and which may trump normal economic concerns. To some 
extent, moral outrage may be triggered by violations of the fairness 
principles identified by equity theory—for example, where the outputs 
are not commensurate with the inputs. However, psychological studies 
have indicated that there is something special about moral outrage, and 
that moralization “is a psychological state that can be turned off and 
on like a switch.”145 This is part of why charges of greed carry such 
rhetorical weight, because most people are still socially and culturally 
conditioned, to some extent, to understand greed as a sin or a vice. The 
theory of moral mandates posits that individuals hold deep moral 
convictions across a series of broad moral categories, which are 
“experienced as psychologically nonnegotiable and as a fundamental 
truth about right and wrong,” whether rational or not.146 They evoke a 
deep sense of outrage, disruption, and disorientation when they are 
violated.147 
 
 139. See id. at 39–42. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 39–40. Some of the evidence Sheffrin cites includes work on the ultimatum and 
dictator games discussed in Part 0, supra. 
 142. See, e.g., id. at 41. 
 143. Id. at 41; see also Henrich, supra note 76. 
 144. SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 45. 
 145. Id. at 44 (citing Stephen Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 13, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html). 
 146. SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 45 (citing Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, Understanding 
Judgments of Fairness ina Real-World Political Context: A Test of the Value Protection Model of 
Justice Reasoning, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1419, 1420 (2002). 
 147. Id. 
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The concept of moral mandates is also important to describing 
greed because it implies that what is considered greedy may vary 
depending on a person’s moral mandates. For example, while one may 
not have strong feelings about executive pay generally, when 
American International Group (AIG), in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis and a subsequent government bailout, paid its 
executives extraordinarily high salaries, public outrage soared.148 In 
that case, equity theory and the concept of desert explain some of the 
sense of unfairness generated by the episode, but the moral outrage 
occasioned went far beyond what one would expect from the usual 
disgust over high executive bonuses.149 This underscores the 
importance of context; high bonuses that may be a source of 
generalized disapproval under normal circumstances when appearing 
to disproportionately reward the recipients are suddenly beyond the 
pale when they are viewed as being paid out of funds belonging to 
others.150 In other words, the bonuses were not earned. 
Moral mandates, together with procedural justice, equity theory, 
and qualified perceptions of fairness, all focus primarily on individual 
conceptions of justice and fairness. Sheffrin’s fifth foundational 
principle focuses on how individual views about fairness and justice 
may be adapted to broader social settings.151 System justification 
theory addresses this by explaining how individuals tend to defend the 
social status quo, even when they are disadvantaged by it.152 This is 
related to cognitive dissonance theory, which suggests that people 
experience psychological tensions when they hold conflicting beliefs, 
views, or thoughts simultaneously.153 In order to relieve this tension, 
people will either change their beliefs or behaviors, or find ways to 
justify or rationalize them.154 For example, a study on system 
justification theory indicated a tendency to prefer the “other” over 
one’s own group, where the “other” is from a group that is perceived 
as more advantaged.155 Additionally, individuals may shift their 
 
 148. Id. at 44. 
 149. See id.   
 150. In this case, the funds were viewed as taxpayer money because the recent government 
bailout. See also infra Part 0. 
 151. SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 49. 
 152. Id. at 50. See also Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: 
Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1119 (2006). 
 153. See SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 49. 
 154. Id. at 49. 
 155. Id. at 51. 
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perceptions and stereotypes as a result of a perceived “system 
threat.”156 Stereotypes may be useful in enforcing a social hierarchy. 
When a threat to that hierarchy is perceived, people may increasingly 
turn to stereotypes to reinforce the status quo.157 
It is thus important to keep system justification theory in mind 
with respect to developing a conception of greed, because it tells us 
that people will be more likely to label behavior as “greedy” when it 
appears to threaten the status quo, and may be reluctant to condemn 
ostensibly greedy behavior that is part of the status quo. However, 
using system justification theory as a constraint on a norm or standard 
is also dangerous, as it describes a psychological tendency to justify 
the status quo, and it has been found that this tendency is often 
strongest among those most harmed by the status quo.158 In that vein, 
it may at times be important to develop norms and standards that 
offend certain notions of folk justice in order to avoid rationalizing a 
status quo that is clearly unjust to certain factions or members of a 
society. For example, Blasi and Jost have argued that creative framing 
may be helpful in addressing the status-quo-rationalizing aspects of 
system justification theory in legal advocacy.159 
2.  Just Deserts160 and Greed 
Each of the foundations of folk justice discussed above 
underscores the importance of the concept of desert, and the 
instinctive acceptance of or desire for outputs that correspond in some 
way with the inputs. Greed has a close relationship to desert. Because 
greed can be conceived of as the act of wanting more than one is 
entitled to,161 our sense of what a person “deserves” can delineate 
whether one is greedy or not. As Sheffrin points out, desert is linked 
to the concept from equity theory of the correlation between inputs 
and outputs.162 It also relates to procedural justice, in that procedural 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Blasi & Jost, supra note 152, at 1122. 
 158. See John T. Jost, M. R. Banaji, & B. A. Nosek, A Decade of System Justification Theory: 
Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 881, 909 (2004). 
 159. Blasi & Jost, supra note 152, at 1183–84. 
 160. As described by economist N. Gregory Mankiw, the concept of “just deserts” simply refers 
to the principle that “people should get what they deserve.” N. Gregory Mankiw, Spreading the 
Wealth Around: Reflections Inspired by Joe the Plumber, 36 E. ECON. J. 285, 295 (2010) 
 161. A.F. ROBERTSON, GREED: GUT FEELINGS, GROWTH, AND HISTORY 27 (2001). 
 162. SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 191. 
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justice may reflect the mechanisms through which people assure 
themselves of the correlation between outputs and inputs—
transparency and voice help to ensure that no one is manipulating the 
process to gain disproportionate or undeserved outputs.163 
However, desert is more complex than the mere correlation of 
inputs and outputs. Some believe that only inputs resulting from 
intentional action (i.e., effort) can be viewed as fairly “deserving” of 
the outputs they receive.164 In this tradition, outputs resulting from 
luck, even including genetic factors, may not truly be deserved.165 
Sheffrin calls this “luck egalitarianism.”166 Experimental evidence 
shows that the public generally supports a concept of deserts that goes 
beyond luck egalitarianism.167 In Sheffrin’s words, the public “accepts 
rewards for achievement as legitimate even in the presence of genetic 
factors.”168 In fact, as long as autonomous and intentional actions are 
significant in generating the output in question, the recipient is usually 
viewed as deserving of the outcome, even if luck is involved.169 
An important area of inquiry with respect to the concept of desert, 
especially in evaluating the role of greed in the financial arena, is 
whether market outcomes can fairly be viewed as deserved. There are 
several critiques of the fairness of market outcomes relating to desert. 
First, from an institutional perspective, the fairness of any market 
outcome (i.e., whether a person deserves the output they get from the 
market in response to their input) depends on the underlying market 
institutions and system of property rights. Some commentators have 
argued that market outcomes cannot be fair unless the underlying 
distribution of property ownership is fair, which may be a questionable 
 
 163. Id. at 33–34. 
 164. Id. at 198–99 (“Another prominent strand of recent philosophical thinking—luck 
egalitarianism—maintains with Rawls that individuals do not deserve material or natural 
advantages. But it departs from Rawls by permitting the recognition and rewarding of individual 
effort.”). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. Note that Rawls would go even further, saying that there is no such thing as pre-
institutional desert, because even things like character, which enable us to put forth effort, are 
essentially matters of luck, depending on when and where a person was born, and into what society. 
In Rawls’s view, the concept of “desert” is limited to institutional desert, or the idea that one can 
only deserve an outcome if it is what is ordained by the laws of the land. 
 167. Id. at 202. 
 168. Id. 
 169. This explains why people such as Warren Buffett and Bill Gates are not typically 
considered greedy—they have input both effort and capital to obtain the rewards they received, 
even if some luck or circumstance was involved in generating their significant wealth. 
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assumption.170 However, this view is not widely shared across 
philosophical traditions and does not seem to comport with the 
concepts of folk justice.171 It may also run afoul of system justification 
theory.172 
Another critique of market fairness from a desert perspective 
raises the concept of proportionality: that market outcomes have a 
tendency to be out of proportion to the inputs used to generate them. 
For example, is the manual laborer who works very hard for long hours 
but earns a modest salary receiving what he “deserves” from the 
market, as compared to the idle millionaire who spends a few hours 
here and there investing his wealth (or paying someone else to do it) 
and earns many multiples of the laborer’s salary? These may be market 
deserts—the market values the capital of the millionaire more highly 
than the hours worked by the unskilled laborer—but some people feel 
that this violates notions of fairness. On the other hand, people do not 
seem to resent market “superstars” such as successful athletes, 
entertainers and musicians (e.g., Michael Jackson, Michael Jordan), 
even though they are able to receive rewards from the market that are 
many times those of other similar persons who are only slightly less 
talented, or slightly less lucky, who may achieve modest success but 
not superstar status.173 
The economist Jonathan Weinstein has theorized that this 
superstar problem of apparent inequality in market outcomes can be 
accounted for by scalability: “Anyone whose output is easily scalable, 
including inventors, entertainers, and financiers, is able to create value 
in proportion to the size of the economy.”174 Thus, small differences 
can lead to vastly different outcomes, and some types of people are in 
a better position to take advantage of scalability, especially in the wake 
 
 170. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2002). 
 171. See SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 203 (arguing that Murphy’s and Nagel’s claim “goes too 
far”). 
 172. In other words, an approach that questions the “status quo” of existing institutions and 
systems of property rights will have difficulty winning popular support. Nonetheless, the Rawlsian 
tradition would support this view and question whether market outcomes can ever truly be 
“deserved.” 
 173. SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 205. See also, Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, 
Winner-Take-All-Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1998) 
(describing the entertainment and sports industries as winner-take-all markets, and discussing the 
implications of winner-take-all markets for tax policy). 
 174. Jonathan Weinstein, Fairness and Tax Policy: A Response to Mankiw’s Proposed “Just 
Deserts”, 37 E. ECON. J. 313, 314 (2011). 
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of globalization, which has expanded the potential market. Weinstein 
goes on to argue, “[f]airness would seem to dictate that they owe a 
greater proportion of their income to the upkeep of society than those 
in non-scalable professions such as a hairdresser, teacher, etc.”175 
Sheffrin, however, argues that folk justice does not seem to be 
overly concerned with proportionality in this regard.176 First, he points 
out that the “superstar” phenomenon may actually be good for other 
market actors.177 For example, salaries in the National Football 
League may be widely divergent, but in spite of a few superstar players 
who make far more than the average, average salaries across the 
league have risen over time, perhaps at least in part due to the 
popularity for the sport generated by a handful of superstars.178 
Additionally, Sheffrin argues that folk justice embraces the maxim, 
“the harder you work the luckier you get.”179 Most people recognize 
this and understand that it is often hard to distinguish luck from the 
outcome resulting directly from hard work and a person’s own 
talents.180 Thus, some output corresponding to the input is acceptable, 
even if there is an element of luck determining the size of the reward. 
How does just desert theory factor into taxation? The economist 
N. Gregory Mankiw, a proponent of just desert theory, has argued that 
in a market-based economy, Pigovian taxes to offset externalities may 
be acceptable as compatible with just desert theory.181 Mankiw also 
recommends that, while just desert theory rules out redistributive 
taxation for its own sake, taxes to pay for public goods and to assist 
the least well-off on the basis of altruism would be advisable.182 
Sheffrin also argues that just desert theory could justify taxing 
windfalls owing to luck at higher rates.183 Such approaches would be 
acceptable even in the absence of greed. 
Furthermore, there seems to be room in the context of just desert 
theory for some redistribution, via the tax system or otherwise, in the 
 
 175. Id. These may be arguments in favor of a progressive tax system, but do not have relevance 
to greed, per se. 
 176. See SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 206. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 202. Sheffrin attributes the quote to the golfer Gary Player. 
 180. See id. at 206. 
 181. Id. at 207. See also Mankiw, supra note 160, at 296. 
 182. Mankiw, supra note 160, at 296. 
 183. SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 208. Others have made similar suggestions. See, e.g., Peter A. 
Prescott, Taxing Luck, 83 MISS. L.J. 117 (2014). 
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case of market failure.184 In that scenario, the market outcome would 
clearly not be “deserved” because there is some institutional or other 
failure that disconnects the input with the output. Mankiw himself 
raises this possibility in the context of executive compensation, via the 
example of the CEO who “pads the corporate board with his 
cronies.”185 Mankiw refers to this as manipulating the system186: 
corporate cronyism defeats the free market with respect to executive 
salaries, and thus disconnects the outcome with the input.187 This is 
market failure generated by greed. Similarly, notes Mankiw, the 
banker whose firm survives as a result of a government bailout would 
not seem to deserve his large bonus, and claims to the contrary would 
constitute greed.188 Sheffrin would agree that these statements 
comport with widely held popular notions of fairness,189 and Mankiw 
argues that his just deserts theory would be acceptable to Robert 
Nozick, Milton Friedman, and other advocates of free market 
economics.190 Prescriptions relating to these kinds of market failures 
are thus unlikely to be objectionable to a large segment of the 
population. 
In sum, concepts from folk justice are vital in considering what is 
fair and unfair to the general public, but they also inform the way that 
many experts consider fairness and justice. “Greed” must invoke 
behavior that is in some way unfair in order to meet the definition of 
greed that we are seeking to outline: acting upon the desire for more 
than what one deserves. As we have discussed, the law generally, and 
tax law more specifically, are loath to criticize actions driven by 
economic self-interest that fit within a framework of fairness and 
desert, including actions taken in a free and fair market.191 But where 
there is market failure or manipulation, greedy behavior should be 
curtailed. 
 
 184. See infra Part 0 (exploring an instance of market failure that may justify special tax 
treatment). 
 185. Mankiw, supra note 160, at 295. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See SHEFFRIN, supra note 4, at 208. 
 190. Mankiw, supra note 160, at 295. 
 191. This is in part explained by system justification theory, outlined in Part III, Section B.1 
above. Because the free market is part of the status quo, people tend to want to defend it; when 
there is a threat to the free market, i.e., in the case of market failure or manipulation, it will be more 
politically palatable to adopt a rule or law to defend the institution. 
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C.  A Definition of Greed 
As outlined in Part III.A. above, a definition of greed as an act or 
acts involving a misappropriation of money, wealth or other resources 
through self-interested behavior, would likely satisfy a majority of 
political views. Such an act would not need to be illegal in a criminal 
or regulatory sense, but could involve misappropriation, agency cost 
problems, or the generation of costly externalities. Concepts of folk 
justice are helpful in further delineating this. Where a self-interested 
actor misappropriates funds through manipulation of institutions, for 
example the stock market, this would violate norms of procedural 
justice and would result in undeserved gains, and could be deemed 
greedy. Mankiw’s just desert theory further aids in drawing the line 
between outputs that are deserved and those that are “greedy” gains—
those achieved through misappropriation and unfair behavior. In these 
scenarios, or where there is market failure, for example, in the case of 
Mankiw’s CEO who manipulated the structures of corporate 
governance to pad his compensation, we can label the behavior as 
greedy. 
Thus, greed requires (a) an appropriation of wealth, money or 
resources for personal gain (b) either through a breach of fiduciary 
duty or contract, manipulation of institutions, market failure, or a 
combination of these. In these narrow cases, greed can be assumed as 
the motive for the act of appropriation, and need not be verified or 
proven. This is because the act itself, under the circumstances set forth 
above, is circumstantial evidence of the greedy motive. Further, the 
act is sufficiently harmful that some sanction or consequence is 
warranted—even where the appropriation is not wholly intentional but 
results from a structure that allows a few to inflict small harms on 
others, as in the case of a situation of market failure, the injustice 
caused should be rectified. Additionally, this definition should only be 
applied to individuals; corporations and other institutional actors 
cannot be greedy in their own right, because the benefits of the 
appropriation ultimately accrue to natural persons, not the entity itself, 
and in such cases the entity is merely the vehicle for the 
appropriation.192 
 
 192. In some cases, shareholders may benefit from what is often loosely termed “corporate 
greed,” but more often it is actors with short-term incentives to cause the appropriation who benefit, 
such as managers seeking to pad a corporation’s earnings report for bonus purposes. See also Joy 
S. Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation Through the Tax 
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This approach, defining greed objectively as an act carried out in 
specified circumstances, addresses the problem of the subjectivity of 
greed. It also addresses the problem of excess as used in the dictionary 
definitions of greed: excess constitutes the component that was not 
deserved. In other words, excess is the portion of a return that arises 
because of the breach, manipulation or market failure. Pure market 
gains, however large, would not be considered greedy, so long as they 
are obtained without fraud, deception, or manipulation, and the market 
is properly functioning. 
Applying this definition of greed to a few paradigm examples is 
illustrative. For example, Gordon Gekko of WALL STREET clearly 
indulged in acts of greed: he used ill-gotten insider information to 
profit at the expense of others.193 He may have believed he was 
engaging in an act for the greater good,194 but regardless of his true 
subjective feelings, the film makes clear that he engaged in financial 
behavior to knowingly enrich himself at the expense of others, and he 
did so through, at the very least, misappropriation of information that 
he did not have a right to. In the film, Gekko was ultimately arrested 
for insider trading,195 but this would also constitute greed under the 
definition outlined above. Similarly, Ebenezer Scrooge from A 
CHRISTMAS CAROL, the quintessential greedy miser, became rich 
while paying his employee barely enough to live on and refusing to 
give to the poor (and intimating they would be better off dead), and he 
apparently profited off lending money to the poor on hard terms.196 
Here again, Scrooge’s wealth derives in part from the starvation wages 
he pays his employee and, presumably, the terms on which he lends 
money. Today, there might be laws preventing the type of behavior 
exhibited by Scrooge (e.g., labor laws and anti-usury or other 
consumer protection rules). Even in the absence of such laws, it 
appears Scrooge is manipulating his power as an employer and lender 
 
Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 493 (2009) (discussing generally the issue of natural 
persons bearing the incidence of corporate costs, including corporate taxation). 
    193.   See WALL STREET (American Entertainment Partners 1987). 
 194. See id. In his famous speech from the film, the character urges that “greed . . . will not 
only save Teldar Paper,” but also the USA. It is unclear whether Gekko believes these words or if 
he is using them to manipulate his audience into doing what he wants. 
    195.  Id. 
    196.  See CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL (POCKET BOOKS, 2007) (1843). 
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to harm those who are less well-off. His behavior would likely fall 
under the definition of greed outlined above.197 
Of course, this definition of greed is limited, and policy may go 
beyond it in some ways. For example, the Tax Code currently contains 
an incentive to encourage charitable giving in the form of a tax 
deduction.198 This indicates the willingness of policy-makers to 
encourage non-greedy behavior (in this case, charitable giving) 
through the Tax Code. As the next section will illustrate, however, 
where the question is whether there should be some kind of tax 
sanction on greed, a limited approach seems prudent. 
IV.  HOW TO TAX GREED: THE CASE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
Now that we have developed a working definition of greed, how 
should it be used in tax policy? Not all greedy behavior needs to be 
addressed by the tax law since, in many cases, regulatory and other 
areas of the law already address the problem. For example, antifraud 
rules in federal securities law and state law target some greedy 
behavior. Similarly, the antitrust laws contain harsh penalties for 
anticompetitive behavior. In tax law, tax evasion is met with severe 
civil and possibly criminal penalties.199 But are there areas where 
greed is insufficiently regulated or punished by existing law? One such 
area may be executive compensation. This Section will explore how 
“taxing greed” may help address the problem of executive pay. It will 
also explore mechanisms for taxing greed. The paradigm for taxing 
greed set forth herein may have application beyond executive 
compensation, but analysis of all the potential applications is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
 
 197. Of course, this definition of greed is limited, and policy may go beyond it in some ways. 
For example, the Tax Code currently contains an incentive to encourage charitable giving in the 
form of a tax deduction. See generally I.R.C. § 170 (2018) and the following note. Failure to be 
charitable with his relative riches (in other words, miserliness) was another fault of Scrooge’s 
character criticized by Dickens. 
 198. I.R.C. § 170 (2018). There are various understandings of the policy goals of these 
provisions, but it seems clear that they indicate Congressional interest in encouraging charity. See 
David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 537 (2006) 
(discussing initial enactment of the charitable deduction in 1917, amid fears that new tax rules 
would chill philanthropic giving). This indicates the willingness of policy-makers to encourage 
non-greedy behavior (in this case, charitable giving) through the Tax Code. As the next Section 
will illustrate, however, where the question is some kind of tax sanction on greed, a limited 
approach seems prudent.  
 199. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201 (2018). 
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A.  Greed and the Executive Pay Problem 
The tax law already makes implicit judgments about greed in the 
realm of executive compensation. Executive compensation in the 
United States is high in both relative and absolute terms, and 
enactment of new tax rules aimed at limiting “excess” 
compensation,200 as well as other regulatory attempts201 to limit such 
compensation, have proven ineffective thus far.202 A report issued in 
2012 showed that the median value of 2011 CEO compensation at 300 
large U.S. public companies was $10.3 million, approximately a 14% 
increase over the temporarily reduced levels of pay during the apex of 
the financial crisis.203 The increase in executive pay over the last 
several decades, as well as its increase relative to the pay of the 
average worker, is well documented: 
Public company CEO pay has increased in real terms by 
500% or more over the last 30 years . . . In 1980 the ratio of 
average CEO pay to average rank-and-file worker pay was 
42 to 1. By the early 1990s, that ratio had increased to 100 to 
1. At the peak of the dot-com bubble in 2000, the ratio 
exceeded 400 to 1. The ratio declined as executive pay 
moderated during the financial crisis, but even in 2009 it 
continued to exceed 200 to 1.204 
Executive pay in general is considered to be economically 
significant. One prominent study found that executive pay constituted 
6.6% of the aggregate earnings of the public companies included in 
the study (companies in the S&P 1500 as well as U.S. public 
 
 200. As discussed below, several provision exist in the tax law currently that are aimed at 
curtailing excess compensation, including § 162(m) and § 280G. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2018); I.R.C. § 
280G(b) (2018). 
 201. See, e.g., Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-
1(a) (requiring shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation at public companies). 
 202. See David I. Walker, A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem, 93 B.U. L. REV. 325, 
375–83 (2013) (discussing the shortcomings of various regulatory responses to the executive pay 
problem); cf. Jenny Li Zhang, et al., Say on Pay Votes and Compensation Practices, 2014 Canadian 
Academic Accounting Association (CAAA) Annual Conference (2014), available at https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377093 (finding that say-on-pay provisions have 
had some limiting effect on executive compensation in firms with higher levels of shareholder 
dissent, at least in relative terms). 
 203. HAY GROUP, PAY FOR PERFORMANCE: EXECUTIVE PAY IN 2011, THE WALL ST. J./ HAY 
GROUP 2011 COMPENSATION STUDY 1 (May 2012), http://www.haygroup.com/downloads/us/wsj 
%20hay%20group%202011%20ceo%20compensation%20study%20web.pdf; see also Walker, 
supra note 202, at 329 (discussing the Hay Group study). 
 204. Walker, supra note 202, at 329–30 (internal citations omitted). 
TOKIC 50.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/19  6:19 PM 
648 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:607 
companies with market capitalization in excess of $50 million), during 
the period 1993–2003, and while 6.6% was the average over the two 
decades, the percentage increased over time.205 Dissemination of this 
kind of information to the public has led to popular outrage about 
executive compensation.206 
The problem of executive compensation is not new. For example, 
in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, much attention was 
focused on the high compensation of certain executives. For example, 
Eugene Grace, the president of Bethlehem Steel, was the subject of 
outrage when it became known that he had received, in addition to his 
base salary of $12,000, a bonus of more than $1.6 million, which 
would amount to more than a $160,000 salary with a bonus in excess 
of $21 million in 2016.207 In 1933, Congress demanded the disclosure 
of salaries for top executives, with the goal of “shaming” companies 
into limiting compensation.208 The release of the information in the 
initial disclosures was met by wide condemnation.209 “For the captains 
of industry to be drawing down large salaries is unconscionable and 
unpatriotic,” declared Senator Burton Wheeler, a Montana 
democrat.210 Several unsuccessful proposals were made to impose 
high rates of tax on compensation over certain amounts. The newly 
implemented disclosure regulations, however, remained in place and 
became increasingly demanding over time.211 The impact of this form 
of indirect regulation on executive pay has proven difficult to measure, 
in part because of efforts to “camouflage” the true levels of 
compensation.212 
 
 205. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 283, 296–97 (2005). 
 206. E.g., Heather Landy, Growing Sense of Outrage Over Executive Pay, WASH. POST (Nov. 
15, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/14/AR20081114037 
89_pf.html; see also Camelia M. Kuhnen & Alexandra Niessen, Public Opinion and Executive 
Compensation, 58 MGMT. SCI. 1249, 1249 (2012) (finding that public outrage has not impacted 
overall executive compensation). 
 207. Thomas F. Cooley, The Spirit of Capitalism: The Role of Executive Compensation in the 
Financial Crisis, (MAX WEBER PROGRAMME LECTURE SERIES Ser. No. 5, 2009), http://pages. 
stern.nyu.edu/~tcooley/docs/Cooley_Max_Weber_Lecture.pdf. 
 208. Steven A. Bank et al., Executive Pay: What Worked?, 42 J. CORP. L. 59, 90 (2016). 
 209. Cooley, supra note 207. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Bank et al., supra note 208, at 90. 
 212. For a general discussion of camouflaging, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY 
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 68–69 
(2004). 
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In the early 1980s, Congress again became concerned by what it 
viewed as “excessive” payments to corporate executives of public 
companies, especially in the context of job changes arising from 
mergers and takeovers. The prevailing sentiment in Congress, and 
even among some of the business community, was that there was a 
climate of excess on Wall Street, of which so-called golden parachute 
payments in connection with mergers and takeovers was a pervasive 
symptom.213 In particular, “Congress believed that corporate decision 
making in takeover situations should not be critically influenced by 
executives’ concern for their own personal benefit.”214 The result was 
the adoption of § 280G and § 4999 of the tax code. Section 280G 
denies the employer a deduction for so-called golden parachute 
payments: compensation to certain employees, contingent on a 
“change in control” transaction occurring, where the payment equals 
or exceeds three times the individual’s base amount (typically the 
average compensation paid for the past five years).215 Section 4999 
imposes a twenty percent excise tax on the recipient of the parachute 
payment on any amounts received in excess of the base amount.216 
An additional provision, added to the tax code in 1993, limits the 
deductibility of salaries by public corporations in excess of $1 million 
unless the compensation is part of a performance-based plan meeting 
certain requirements.217 Section 162(m), entitled “certain excessive 
 
 213. See, e.g., Felix Rohatyn, On a Buyout Binge and a Takeover Tear, WALL ST. J., May 18, 
1984, at 2–3; Takeover Tactics and Public Policy: Hearing on H.R. 2371, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5693, 
H.R.5694, H.R. 5695, and H.R. 5696 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Consumer Prot., and 
Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 316–17 (1984) (statement of Felix G. 
Rohatyn, Lazard Freres Investment Banking) (commenting that the “present environment is more 
reminiscent of the type of speculative excesses and corporate behavior of the late 1920s” and 
arguing for limitations on the ability of corporations to grant “golden parachute” contracts); 
Takeover Tactics and Public Policy: Hearing on H.R. 2371 et al. Before the Subcomm. on 
Telecomms, Consumer Prot., and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 384 (May 22, 1984) (statement of Charles T. Munger, Vice Chairman, Board of Berkshire 
Hathaway) (referring to the current “economic scene” as causing revulsion and being full of God-
awful excess”). 
 214. Ryan Miske, Note, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to 
Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1678 (2004) 
(citing GERALD A. KAFKA, TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS: REASONABLE COMPENSATION, A-
37 (3d ed. 2003)). 
 215. See I.R.C. § 280G(b) (2017). 
 216. See I.R.C. § 280G(b) (2017); I.R.C § 162(m) (2006); see also Kevin Murphy, Executive 
Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There 66 (Aug. 12, 2012) (Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance, Working Paper), http://www.laef.ucsb.edu/pages/conferences/aae13/ 
papers/murphy.pdf (discussing the adoption of §§ 280G and § 4999). 
 217. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2018). 
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employee remuneration,” was enacted amidst populist outrage over 
high executive compensation following the 1992 presidential 
election.218 Congress apparently believed that the rule would reduce 
“excessive compensation.”219 
Later, executive compensation again entered the limelight in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis when the government stepped in to 
provide emergency funding for certain financial institutions on the 
brink of bankruptcy and whose failure could jeopardize the entire U.S. 
financial system. In the wake of the government bailout and 
establishment of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), 
Congress amended the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
(“EESA,” the law establishing TARP) to include certain restrictions 
on executive pay for companies in the program.220 However, the 
EESA restrictions were found insufficient to curb what was widely 
viewed as excessive executive pay for TARP recipients.221 As 
discussed above, AIG (among other firms) later announced significant 
bonus payments to executives, ostensibly paid out under contracts pre-
existing TARP and which the company claimed it was legally 
obligated to make.222 This was met with populist outrage by the public 
and lawmakers. The House Judiciary Committee, for example, 
responded with the “End GREED” Act, using “GREED” as a clever 
acronym for Government Reimbursement of Excessive Executive 
Disbursements.223 The Act, which was modeled on bankruptcy law 
and fraudulent transfer cases, was defeated in Congress, but this was 
not the end of the issue.224 
In each of the instances discussed above, the legislative and 
political history reflects a Puritan disgust at excess,225 as well as a 
 
 218. Miske, supra note 214, at 1686. 
 219. Id. (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,211, 107 
Stat. 312, 469-71 (1993)). 
 220. See Executive Pay Restrictions for TARP Recipients: An Assessment, 111th Cong. 49 
(2010) (statement of Kevin J. Murphy, Kenneth L. Trefftz Chair in Finance, University of Southern 
California, Marshall School of Business). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion 
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/business/15AIG.html. 
 223. See Thomas, supra note 12, at 440. 
 224. Id.; see also Murphy, supra note 216, at 47–51 (discussing other legislative actions aimed 
at limiting executive pay for TARP recipients). 
 225. See SKIP WORDEN, GODLINESS AND GREED: SHIFTING CHRISTIAN THOUGHT ON PROFIT 
AND WEALTH 118–19 (2010) (characterizing the Protestant Reformation as a reaction against a 
pro-wealth Christian paradigm that emerged during the Renaissance, and thus a rejection of a “love 
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sense that something unfair or underhanded was occurring. Often 
politicians and legislators expressed sentiments that reflect findings 
from Sheffrin’s work on folk justice. For example, at a Congressional 
hearing to discuss executive pay at firms participating in TARP, 
Congressman Welch stated: 
One of the things that we have learned in this entire 
catastrophe of the financial meltdown is that most of the 
things that were done that are truly outrageous and harmful 
to taxpayers and our economy were all legal. Legal but not 
fair and not right.226 
Sheffrin himself referred to the AIG bonus scandal as an example 
of moral mandates as well as a violation of just desert theory.227 Also 
explicit in the legislative history was Congress’s view that 
compensation over a reasonable228 amount in certain contexts is an 
abuse of corporate funds, which may be regulated through the tax law 
or through other mechanisms (i.e., corporate law on fiduciary duty, 
which is generally a matter of state law). This reflects the 
understanding that excessive compensation can be a breach of 
fiduciary duty, or otherwise caused by some form of market failure. 
Numerous experts have argued that there is a failure in the market 
for executive labor.229 One explanation of this market failure is the 
“managerial power” problem: the opportunism and influence of 
managers over a captive board of directors charged with setting the 
managers’ pay.230 Because the CEO exercises significant influence 
over the board, the board of directors is not an effective stand-in for 
independent shareholders interested in maximizing their own profits, 
negotiating at arm’s length with the executive regarding the 
employment contract.231 Essentially, according to this theory, 
 
of gain excess,” and describing the Calvinist Puritan position specifically as rejecting greed and 
immoderate gain). 
 226. Executive Compensation: How Much is Too Much?: Before the Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform H.R., 111th Cong. 181 (2009) (remarks of Rep. Welch following testimony of 
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation). 
 227. Sheffrin, supra note 4, at 44, 48. 
 228. Reasonableness is the standard for deductibility of compensation under the general rule of 
I.R.C. § 162, and is a term of art. Here, the term is used more colloquially. 
 229. Walker, supra note 202, at 332. 
 230. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 754 (2002). 
 231. This type of negotiation is generally referred to in the literature as part of optimal 
contracting. Id. at 755. Bebchuk and Fried identify a number of ways in which CEOs exert influence 
over the board of directors, including: CEOs can influence whether a board member is nominated 
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executives are able to set their own compensation, constrained only by 
an “outrage” factor, which recognizes the potential limiting power of 
public reaction to extremely high CEO pay.232 There is also evidence 
that complex option compensation schemes and other tools are 
implemented to “camouflage” the true level of CEO pay from public 
scrutiny.233 
In addition, there are some who have argued that “excessive” pay 
raises fiduciary concerns, and in some instances, may represent a 
breach of fiduciary duty.234 This argument builds off the “managerial 
power” and principal-agent problem identified by other scholars, 
noting that compensation committees and boards of directors may be 
paying out compensation far in excess of the value provided to the 
firm by the executives, and thus failing to act on behalf of a firm’s 
shareholders. This fiduciary argument could be expanded to all 
taxpayers in scenarios where firms receiving government bailouts 
continue to pay excessive compensation. 
The tax rules and other laws enacted so far to limit excessive 
compensation do not appear to have solved the market failure and 
agency problems. In spite of Congress’s clear intention to limit 
“excessive” compensation, the result of § 162(m) was ultimately to 
encourage implementation of a $1 million base salary for executives 
as a kind of standard, and a move towards greater stock option 
compensation for executives.235 The stock option compensation is 
 
and re-elected to his or her seat on the board; directors and CEOs may have business dealings 
outside of the particular company—directors are often involved with other companies to which the 
CEO may direct business, for example; additionally, CEOs may be able to direct a company’s 
charitable contributions to charities favored by board members; and CEOs may be able to help 
directors obtain additional lucrative directorships. They also discuss social constraints arising from 
the way board members interact with each other and with company management. See generally 
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 212. 
 232. Bebchuk, et al., supra note 230, at 756. The discussion of “outrage” constraints identify 
public opinion as a limiting factor on executive compensation; how exactly this operates to 
constrain executive pay is not entirely clear. Michael S. Weisbach, Optimal Executive 
Compensation versus Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried’s ‘Pay 
without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation’, 45 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 419, 423 (2007). However, the “costs” of such outrage may relate to higher risk of 
shareholder lawsuits, reputational costs for the directors of the firm, or other factors. The outrage 
is also potentially explained by Sheffrin’s “folk justice”: the public may have a negative reaction 
to high executive pay because it is not viewed as deserved, in contrast to the extremely high pay of 
a superstar athlete or entertainer. There may also be an element of moral mandates involved. 
 233. Bebchuk et al., supra note 230, at 789. 
 234. See Austin Frerick, Executive Pay Excess Raises Fiduciary Concerns, 153 TAX NOTES 85 
(2016). 
 235. Miske, supra note 214, at 1687. 
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designed to meet the “pay for performance” constraint of § 162(m), 
but can generally be designed as a de facto guarantee.236 In addition, 
firms frequently pay out nondeductible compensation in excess of the 
§ 162(m) limitation.237 One study indicated that such nondeductible 
compensation increased significantly over the period of 2005–2013.238 
Both the market failure and fiduciary duty issues raised by 
executive compensation indicate that payment/receipt of excessive 
compensation should be considered greed: it meets the definition of 
an appropriation of money in one of the specified circumstances. It is 
also supportable under just desert theory, in which some amount of 
compensation is of course warranted, but an “excess” portion is 
beyond what was deserved.239 In addition, there may be externalities 
caused by executive compensation practices that would warrant a 
remedy under Sheffrin’s theory of tax fairness, drawing on Mankiw’s 
just desert argument as outlined above.240 Building on this, the 
following section will address how, using the theory of greed, we 
might be able to implement tax rules to remedy the executive pay 
problem. 
B.  Taxing Executive Greed 
It has been widely recognized that “fixing” executive 
compensation is a difficult task.241 Some commentators have criticized 
the approach of using tax laws to limit executive compensation in 
general.242 Still, others have argued that executive compensation does 
not in fact need to be “fixed,” since pay and performance are generally 
correlated (implying that the executives have “earned” their high 
 
 236. Frerick, supra note 234, at 86–87. 
 237. See id. at 87. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See text accompanying notes 184–190. 
 240. See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, Fed. Reg. 36395 (June 25, 
2010) (stating that “[f]lawed incentive compensation practices in the financial industry were one 
of many factors contributing to the financial crisis that began in 2007”). 
 241. See generally Kevin Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got 
There, 66 (Aug. 12, 2012) (Handbook of the Economics and Finance, Working Paper), 
http://www.laef.ucsb.edu/pages/conferences/aae13/papers/murphy.pdf; see also Weisbach, supra 
note 232, at 428. (noting that the problem of “market failure” with respect to executive 
compensation seems to be an enduring feature of corporate governance, and it is unclear how 
regulating it will “make things better”). 
 242. See, e.g., Joy S. Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation 
Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485 (2009); Susan J. Stabile, Is There a Role 
for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 94–100 (1998). 
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salaries, at least in most cases).243 However, even proponents of this 
perspective tend to admit that executives are often overcompensated, 
but argue that political responses to the problem do not get to the root 
of the issue and often exacerbate it through unintended consequences. 
For example, political responses to the executive pay problem in the 
early 1990s favored the use of stock compensation, which has 
contributed significantly to the growth in overall executive 
compensation over the past few decades.244 
The greed paradigm may be useful in resolving the debate of 
whether and how government intervention in executive compensation 
makes sense. The problems with executive pay outlined above 
illustrate an appropriation: executive compensation removes money 
from the firm, and thus its incidence must ultimately be borne either 
by the owners of the firm or by its employees, consumers, or possibly, 
creditors. Of course, where the compensation is properly “deserved,” 
there should be no problem—in a properly functioning market, it does 
not reduce salaries for other employees, raise costs for consumers, or 
result in unpaid creditors. Fully informed shareholders would be 
willing to make the payments which would compensate CEOs for their 
services to the firm and value created. But there is almost unanimous 
agreement that this is not the case with the market for executive 
compensation. While the growth in executive salaries over time has 
some correlation with increases in firm value, it is not proportionate,245 
and it is also out of line with increases in average employee 
compensation.246 There is no empirical evidence indicating that 
executives provide value in any way in proportion to their salaries, and 
there is much to indicate that something is wrong.247 Whether 
characterized as a market failure or an issue of fiduciary breach for 
 
 243. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get, HARV. BUS. 
REV., March-April 1986, at 125. Murphy does acknowledge, however, that there may be room for 
improvement in correlating pay and performance, but takes issue with most political responses to 
the “problem.” See Murphy, supra note 216, at 156. 
 244. Murphy, supra note 216, at 153. 
 245. See Melanie Cao & Rong Wang, Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence, 68 J. FIN. 2001, 2002 (2013) (“From 1994 to 2009, median incentive pay 
increased by 244% in real terms, compared with a 40% increase in median firm value, and its share 
of total pay increased from 41% to 78.8%.”). 
 246. See Walker, supra note 202, at 330. 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 229–233. 
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which the courts are unwilling to step in,248 excessive executive 
salaries are a problem that can be characterized as greed-driven. 
The problem of greed, as detailed above, is the problem of 
obtaining something not deserved or earned: greed may be a natural 
impulse, but if regulated by self-control, it is a purely personal 
struggle. It is only when greed drives a person to act for his or her own 
personal gain at the cost of others that it becomes a political or societal 
problem. This returns us to the definition of greed outlined above: an 
appropriation that occurs as a result of market failure or manipulation, 
or in the context of a breach of fiduciary duty, contract, and so on. The 
goal of a tax on greed, then, should be to deter the greedy behavior, 
and, where it occurs, to compensate those harmed. This is a much more 
limited approach to executive compensation than direct regulation, 
which has been characterized as “the last available cure for executive 
paychecks.”249 
The problem with the executive compensation laws and rules 
enacted thus far is that they do not penalize the greedy or compensate 
those harmed. For example, in the wake of the enactment of § 280G 
and § 4999, gross-ups and other contractual avoidances of the 
limitations were implemented, thus passing on the cost to the firm.250 
Similarly, the § 162(m) provision denying deductions for 
compensation in excess of a certain amount has resulted in companies 
paying larger nondeductible amounts to their executives.251 To the 
extent implemented, direct regulation has not proven effective and is 
generally thought to be an inappropriate approach.252 So a tax on greed 
would need to address the problem of gross-ups and other tactics that 
merely shift the burden to the corporation and its shareholders (and 
possibly other stakeholders).253 
Generally, the paradigm of taxing greed offers several possible 
approaches. If the appropriated money or goods belong to the public 
at large, and thus constitute public goods, a 100% tax on the value of 
 
 248. See Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 779 (2002) (discussing the failure of judicial review to 
operate as a check on executive compensation). 
 249. DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: HOW EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID 
AND HOW IT AFFECTS AMERICA, 45, 116 (1993). 
 250. Walker, supra note 202, at 355. 
 251. Frerick, supra note 234, at 87. 
 252. Bank, supra note 208, at 89. 
 253. See Mullane, supra note 242, at 493. 
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the money or goods in excess of what was deserved may be warranted 
to correct the misappropriation.254 Drawing the line between what was 
truly deserved and what was misappropriated may caution against a 
100% tax; a cautious approach might thus impose a tax significantly 
in excess of the usual rate of tax that might apply, perhaps in the range 
of 70–80 percent.255 Even more conservatively, a lower rate could be 
set to serve as a deterrent or partial corrective device, while still 
providing padding for administrative error. If, on the other hand, the 
appropriated money or other goods belonged to a particular person or 
group, perhaps a surtax and a commensurate transfer to the injured 
party would be appropriate. 
At least one commentator has made a proposal for a surtax on 
excessive executive compensation, potentially accompanied by a 
compensatory transfer to shareholders, that would meet the criteria of 
the proposed approach to taxing greed. David I. Walker’s proposed 
Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem outlines a surtax on 
excessive compensation and recommends coupling this tax with 
investor tax relief to compensate shareholders for the harm caused by 
the excessive compensation.256 In Walker’s words, the surtax would 
operate to “reduce the after-tax income of executives, which responds 
to the unfairness of executives receiving excessive compensation and 
to the distortion in the executive labor market created by the existence 
of these rents.”257 This is precisely the goal of the taxing greed 
paradigm: to reduce unfairness and correct distortions. If the proposal 
actually exerted downward pressure on compensation, that would be 
beneficial, but it need not do so in order to achieve its goal of 
extracting or reallocating at least a portion of “unearned” income.258 
Additionally, the surtax might help reassert norms of acceptable 
behavior and “reasonable” compensation.259 This norm-setting effect 
 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 181–190 (discussing tax responses to the problem of 
taking or acquiring something that is not deserved). 
 255. This range has been identified in the economic literature as a possible optimal rate of tax 
to impose on labor income of the highest earners, as the limit for revenue raising without 
discouraging the labor that creates income. See Thomas Piketty et al., Optimal Taxation of Top 
Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities, 6 AM. ECON. J. 230, 233 (Feb. 2014) (identifying 83% 
as the socially optimal tax rate for top labor incomes). 
 256. See Walker, supra note 202, at 328. 
 257. Id. at 346. 
 258. Walker states that he does not expect the surtax to result in lower before-tax salaries. Id. 
at 348. 
 259. Id. at 385. 
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of the surtax could be amplified through careful framing of the surtax 
proposal as a tax on greed, making use of the “folk justice” 
conceptions of greed and fairness set forth in Part III above.260 
Walker’s proposed surtax would piggyback on existing executive 
pay rules: thus, anything that is currently subject to the normal income 
tax would be subject to the surtax in excess of a certain threshold, 
including salary, annual bonus, long-term incentive plan payouts, the 
vesting of restricted stock, the exercise of non-qualified stock options, 
and the receipt of various taxable perks such as personal use of 
corporate jets.261 Implementation of the surtax would be accompanied 
by repeal of existing tax rules aimed at limiting compensation.262 
Additionally, like the existing surtax under § 4999, there is a 
possibility that the incidence of this surtax could, at least in part, be 
passed on to the firm. A prohibition on explicit gross-ups for the surtax 
could help, but would not address larger compensation packages that 
implicitly shift the incidence of the surtax from the executive to the 
firm. However, Walker posits that a surtax on all elements of executive 
pay would be less likely than a surtax based on section 4999 to result 
in gross-up efforts, because it does not raise the behavior-distorting 
concerns of the section 4999 golden parachute provision.263 Further, 
under the managerial power view of executive compensation, 
additional pre-tax compensation to account for the post-tax impact of 
the surtax could be limited by the outrage constraint.264 Thus, there is 
reason to believe that if the tax is properly formulated, executives 
should not be able to shift the incidence of the surtax to their 
employers.265 
A strict surtax does raise another issue: avoidance. As Walker 
notes, there are limited avoidance opportunities with his proposed 
surtax in terms of compensation structure.266 While it may increase 
incentives to use forms of compensation not subject to the surtax, such 
as untaxed perks and other fringe benefits, the ability of firms to use 
 
 260. Some experts have argued that cultural norms were one of the most significant factors 
limiting executive compensation in earlier eras. See Bank, supra note 208, at 63. 
 261. Walker, supra note 202, at 347. 
 262. Id. at 350. 
 263. Id. at 355–56. 
 264. Id. at 356–57. 
 265. See id. at 359. 
 266. See id. at 362. 
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these is quite limited.267 A more potentially pernicious form of 
avoidance would relate to firm structure.268 Walker argues that 
limiting the surtax to executives of public companies would only 
increase the cost of becoming public, offering yet another incentive 
for companies to stay or go private.269 This would also impose the 
surtax on what may in fact be a minority of highly compensated 
executives.270 Thus, it would make sense to extend the surtax to 
executives of privately held firms as well. The impact of this, however, 
may be to incentivize privately held firms to use a pass-through 
organizational form where partnership profits can be used as 
compensation. To avoid or mitigate this distortion, Walker suggests 
consideration of a lower surtax on private company executives, 
perhaps set at half that of the surtax imposed on public company 
executives.271 
Walker sets neither a numerical value for the surtax, nor a 
threshold above which it should apply. He suggests, as a possibility, a 
surtax of ten percent, thus raising the marginal combined federal and 
state rates on the income to fifty-five percent or more.272 Such an 
increase, while not insignificant, should not have significant labor-
stifling effects.273 However, there are other possibilities: for example, 
the surtax could be graduated to increase as the excess compensation 
increases.274 Further, he suggests retaining the $1 million threshold of 
§ 162(m).275 One reason is that when the $1 million “cap” was set 
through enactment of § 162(m), the cap actually created a focal point 
for setting executive compensation and resulted in increases to $1 
million for executives whose salaries were below the limit.276 Walker 
argues that this weighs in favor of setting a low initial threshold, with 
the surtax rate increasing gradually with the amount of income in 
excess of the threshold.277 The taxing greed paradigm seems well-
 
 267. Id. at 364–65. 
 268. See id. at 365. 
 269. Id. at 366. 
 270. Id. (citing Jon Bakija et al., Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and the Causes of 
Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data (April 2012) (Williams College, 
Working Paper)). 
 271. Id. at 367. 
 272. Id. at 351. 
 273. Id. at 351; see also Piketty et al., supra note 255. 
 274. Walker, supra note 202, at 347. 
 275. See id. at 383. 
 276. Id. at 361. 
 277. See id. at 362. 
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suited to a graduated-rate surtax: the greedier you are, the more tax 
you pay. In the interest of caution and avoiding distortions, and in light 
of the existing literature on elasticity of top labor incomes, the surtax 
might start at ten percent and increase to an upper rate resulting in a 
top marginal rate of around eighty percent.278 
Does this properly address excess, as defined in terms of 
compensation beyond what was properly “earned”? Defining the 
excess in the market for executive labor is complex, since 
compensation levels will vary across industries and among executives 
and firms. Walker suggests the possibility of customizing the surtax to 
account for firm size and risk.279 Another approach would involve 
setting the surtax on the basis of intrafirm pay ratios: for example, the 
surtax could apply to any compensation in excess of twenty times the 
compensation of the average worker at the firm.280 Information on pay 
ratios is already available to some extent as a result of disclosure rules 
in the Dodd-Frank Act,281 but there are problems with this approach, 
since there is no uniform mechanism for calculating average worker 
compensation. While such a metric could be considered, it may be 
overly complex. 
Walker’s proposal of a relatively low threshold combined with a 
graduated surtax, starting low, may be the simplest way to 
approximate excess, even if it is a second-best approach that may leave 
some excess untaxed. It may also result in taxing compensation that is 
not in fact excessive. As noted above, just desert theory and notions of 
fairness generally accept so-called superstar salaries. And there may 
be some superstar CEOs whose talents, reputation, and charisma, 
among other traits, may actually result in their “deserving” the 
compensation they receive. For example, few have argued that Bill 
Gates or Steve Jobs did not deserve their compensation. 
However, as one study notes, so-called superstar CEOs are often 
crowned by the media, and so their lauded talents and reputation may 
 
 278. See Piketty et al., supra note 255, at 233. 
 279. Walker, supra note 202, at 347. 
 280. Twenty percent as a threshold has received some general support over the years. See, e.g., 
GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN 
EXECUTIVES 24 (1992). However, there is little empirical support available for what would be a 
proper amount. 
 281. Dodd Frank, Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a) 
(2012). 
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not have anything to do with the value they create for their firms.282 
The same study, using a data set of CEOs who won prominent nation-
wide awards offered only to CEOs, compares award-winning and 
other CEOs in terms of their compensation and firm performance.283 
The results of the study suggest that increased CEO status decreases 
subsequent firm performance.284 CEO superstars may actually be able 
to extract even higher rents from their firms in the managerial power 
paradigm. However, the study acknowledges some inconsistencies 
with the conclusion that superstar CEOs may not in fact be deserving 
of their compensation: first, firm performance did not significantly 
decrease in firms with strong shareholder governance, indicating that 
the problem may be remediable.285 Second, it is possible that the ex 
post value destruction following receipt of an award is an expected 
slump after ex ante value creation achieved in seeking the received 
recognition.286 
The result of this evidence is that it is unclear whether superstar 
CEOs might deserve compensation that, while high in strict numerical 
terms, is not excessive in terms of the taxing greed paradigm. This 
may caution in favor of using a more tailored approach to establishing 
a surtax, rather than the blunt instrument of a low monetary threshold 
and graduated surtax rates. Using the metrics of firm size and risk 
identified by Walker and others may be the better approach to avoid 
taxing non-greedy compensation.287 
The second component of a tax on greedy executive 
compensation, investor tax relief, is intended to “offset the 
distortionary effects of excessive compensation on investment. If we 
think of excessive executive pay as being an economic tax on 
investment, reducing actual investment taxes should mitigate the 
adverse effect.”288 It would also help to ensure that investors were not 
harmed by any shifting of the new surtax to the firm through increased 
compensation.289 The investor tax relief could take several forms, but 
 
 282. Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Superstar CEOs, 124 Q. J. ECON. 1593 (2009). 
 283. Id. at 1599. 
 284. Id. at 1634. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Walker, supra note 202, at 347 (citing Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, 
2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 75, 77–80 (2010)). 
 288. Id. at 368. 
 289. Id. 
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Walker advocates for either dividend tax relief or a reduction in 
general corporate tax rates commensurate with the amount of the 
surtax.290 Both approaches have pros and cons in terms of their 
effectiveness, salience, and distortionary effects. However, either 
approach would generally be in keeping with the taxing greed 
paradigm. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Greed has been invoked in political rhetoric to argue for populist 
political policies, to condemn behavior popularly viewed as unfair, 
and even to support progressive tax policy. This Article engages in an 
analytically rigorous consideration of greed in an effort to evaluate 
whether “greed” can be more than merely a rhetorical tool. This effort 
indicates that greed should have a very limited place in the various 
overarching policy debates on inequality, distribution of the tax 
burden, and progressivity, but it may nonetheless have its place in the 
box of tax policy tools. 
Taking into account lessons from political and economic 
philosophy as well as empirical economic literature, this Article 
illustrates that greed can and should be narrowly defined to focus on 
behavior that involves some breach of social and economic norms: an 
appropriation for personal gain that either intentionally causes harm 
through illegality, breach of duty or contract, or as a result of market 
failure or manipulation. Thus, cautiously defined, it should be possible 
to develop a political consensus around taxing greed: imposing a 
higher rate of tax on the undeserved gains that can be used at least in 
part to offset those who were harmed by the greedy behavior. Focusing 
on the realm of executive compensation, this framework provides 
support for a surtax or other mechanism for imposing a higher rate of 
tax on compensation above a certain threshold, ideally accompanied 
by a mechanism for returning some of the undeserved income to 
shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 290. Id. at 374. 
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